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Taking Narrow Channel Collision Prevention
Seriously To More Effectively Manage Marine
Transportation System Risk
Craig H. Allen*
I
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System high-
lights the importance to the nation of maintaining an effective, efficient and
safe Marine Transportation System (MTS).1 That system comprises vessels,
waterways, ports, intermodal connections, related infrastructure and the sys-
tem's users. Within the vital waterways of the nation's MTS are some
25,000 miles of commercially navigable channels. 2 Some of those channels
are gifts of nature. Others were wrested from nature by resourceful and
determined engineers charged by Congress to support and facilitate the
nation's security and maritime commerce.' Many of those channels are nar-
row, forcing vessels into close and sometimes dangerous proximity. A group
of experts recently sounded the alarm over a mounting problem within the
navigable waterways of the United States. In an article subtitled "When
Ships Get Too Big for their Ditches," the experts observed that, "for many
years, the U.S. has been putting bigger and bigger ships (and more of them)
into the same old ditches, digging them deeper but making them no wider."4
* Judson Falknor Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author is a member of the U.S.
Navigation Safety Advisory Council; however, the views expressed are his own and do not necessarily
reflect those of any other member of the Council or of any agency of the federal or Washington state gov-
ernment. Portions of this Article were adapted from chapter 9 of Craig H. Allen, Farwell's Rules of the
Nautical Road (8th ed. 2005) (@ 2005 by the author).
U.S. Department of Transportation, National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System (July
10, 2008) [hereinafter "MTS Strategy"], available at www.cmts.gov.
'Committee on Marine Transportation System, Fact Sheet on the Marine Transportation System,
available at http://www.cmts.gov/docs/mtsfactsheet.pdf.
'See generally National Research Council, Marine Board, Dredging Coastal Ports: An Assessment of
the Issues (1985); National Research Council, Marine Board, The Marine Transportation System and the
Federal Role: Measuring Performance, Targeting Improvement-Special Report 279 (2004).
"William 0. Gray, et al., Channel Design and Vessel Maneuverability - Next Steps (When Ships Get
Too Big for their Ditches), 40 Marine Technology, Apr. 1, 2003, at 93, available at
http://www.usna.edulnaoe/channel/fmal.pdf.
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For waterway stewards and risk managers who take narrow channel colli-
sion prevention seriously, the trends identified by the experts will present a
daunting challenge in the coming years. The narrow channel rule has the
potential to help manage those risks, but its potential has yet to be fully real-
ized.
Rule 9 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREGS)5 and the U.S. Inland Navigation Rules' prescribes a unique col-
lision prevention scheme for "narrow channels and fairways." When it
applies, Rule 9 of these two sets of "rules of the road" imposes a number of
distinct obligations on vessel operators. For Rule 9 or any other collision
avoidance rule to be effective, however, mariners must know when and where
the rule applies. Unnecessary risk is injected into a situation whenever the
rules fail to provide the mariner with sufficient direction or guidance to deter-
mine which rules apply to any given situation. Ambiguity in the rule may
result in the operators of approaching vessels coming to conflicting conclu-
sions regarding the rule's application or in delayed collision avoidance maneu-
vers while those operators negotiate a solution to what is otherwise a doubt-
ful, and often a rapidly developing, situation.
With shrewd understatement, two of the world's leading authorities on the
rules of the road for preventing vessel collisions report that "the term 'nar-
row channel' is not easily defined."' Indeed, the international conference
that drafted the 1972 COLREGS rejected a proposal to include a definition
of "narrow channel"' and the United States Congress simply ignored the
matter. Perhaps, like "pornography," another mixed question of law and fact,
we should be content to know a narrow channel when we see one, even if
'International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, T.I.A.S. 8587, 28 U.S.T. 3459
[hereinafter "COLREGS"]. The 38 numbered rules comprising the COLREGS, often referred to as the
"International Rules of the Road," apply to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected
therewith navigable by seagoing vessels, except where an appropriate authority has promulgated special
rules for roadsteads, harbors, rivers, lakes or inland waterways connected with the high seas and naviga-
ble by seagoing vessels. Id. art. 1.
'Inland Navigation Rules Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-591, 94 Stat. 3415 (1980), 33 U.S.C. ch. 34.
In accordance with COLREGS art. 1(b), the United States has promulgated these "Inland Navigation
Rules" for certain waterways shoreward of the "demarcation lines" that divide waters covered by the
"international rules" from those covered by the "inland rules." See 33 C.F.R. pt. 80 (2009).
'A. Norman Cockcroft & Jan N. F. Lameijer, A Guide to the Collision Avoidance Rules 61 (6th ed.
2004).
'The omission was not a mere oversight. See Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), Summary Record of Eighth Meeting of Committee I of the Conference on Revision of the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 10, 1972, Doc. CR/CONF/C.1/SR.8
(May 10, 1973), at 8 (reporting that, in response to a proposal by Indonesia to define the phrase "narrow
channel," delegates from Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States all objected
that they preferred to leave the phrase undefined). The final Senate report on the Inland Navigation Rules
Act of 1980 does not mention the issue. See S. Rep. No. 96-979 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 7068,7077-78.
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the rule drafters cannot define it for us.9 Many believe that mariners-and
those who depend on mariners to prevent accidents on the nation's water-
ways-deserve better. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) agrees. In its investigation into a 1981 collision between two tow-
boats, one of which concluded the inland rivers location fell within the nar-
row channel rule while the other concluded it did not, the Board reasoned
that it does "operators little good to learn months after an accident that a
court has ruled that a particular portion of a waterway, under a particular set
of circumstances was or was not a 'narrow channel' under the rules, and that
the narrow channel rule should or should not have been applied by the par-
ties involved in the accident.""o
The U.S. Coast Guard concurred with the NTSB's 1982 recommendation
to provide more guidance, but it carefully qualified its concurrence. In a let-
ter from the Coast Guard Commandant to the NTSB chair, the Coast Guard
explained that "[to] define a 'narrow channel' so as to apply to all situations
would be virtually impossible. It is possible, however, that the factors to be
considered in determining when to apply the Rule can be bounded and broad
guidance issued to mariners."" More that twenty-five years later, no guid-
ance listing the "factors" mariners should consider in determining which
channels and fairways fall under Rule 9 has been issued. In fact, other than
some early discussions among members of the former Rules of the Road
Advisory Council between 1982 and 1984,2 the issue received little atten-
tion until several concerned Coast Guard captains of the port took steps to
designate certain waterways within their areas of responsibility as narrow
channels or fairways for purposes of Rule 9. Partly in response to those
developments and the concern that they "may require the Coast Guard to
consider officially designating certain waters/waterways as narrow chan-
nels," the Coast Guard brought the issue before the U.S. Navigation Safety
Advisory Council (NAVSAC) in the spring of 2009." The Coast Guard's
'See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (while declining to define
pornography, reporting that "I know it when I see it...").
"National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Collision of the U.S. Towboat MN Bruce Brown
and Tow with the U.S. Towboat MN Fort Dearborn and Tow, Mile 677.6, Ohio River, Dec. 9, 1981,
Report NTSB-MAR-82-5 (Jun. 17, 1982) (NTSB Recommendation M-82-32). See also letter from Jim
Burnett, NTSB Chairman, to Admiral James S. Gracey, Commandant of the Coast Guard, June 30, 1982
(copy on file with the author).
"Letter from Admiral James S. Gracey, Commandant of the Coast Guard, to James E. Burnett, Jr.,
NTSB Chairman, Oct. 6, 1982 (copy on file with the author).
"The Rules of the Road Advisory Council (RORAC) was established by Congress in 1980 to provide
advice to the Coast Guard. See Inland Navigation Rules Act, supra, note 6 § 5. Its charter was expanded
and it was renamed the Navigation Safety Advisory Council (NAVSAC) in 1989. See Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-225, § 105(a), 103 Stat. 1908 (1989), 33 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006).
"U.S. Coast Guard, NAVSAC Task Statement, Task 09-05 (copy on file with the author).
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task statement asked NAVSAC to provide advice on whether there is a need
to designate waterways as narrow channels and, if so, to identify criteria by
which waterways can be so designated.14
This Article takes up that task, but does so by locating the narrow chan-
nel rule in the larger context of risk management in confined waters. It
begins by examining the risks posed by vessel navigation in narrow chan-
nels and fairways in the United States and the risk management measures
employed to eliminate or reduce those risks, including the narrow channel
rule in the applicable rules of the road. The Article then identifies problems
with the existing rule and examines several alternatives to address the prob-
lems. The Article concludes that mariners deserve clearer guidance on how
to identify the waters where Rule 9 applies than they have so far been given.
To provide the needed guidance, the Coast Guard should initiate rulemaking
to formally designate waterways in the United States where Rule 9 applies.
An easier, but less effective, alternative would be for the Coast Guard to
publish a list of prior determinations on the status of U.S. waterways as nar-
row channels or fairways, together with a guidance document setting out
specific criteria to apply in making determinations for waters not yet the
subject of a determination.
MANAGING NARROW CHANNEL RISKS: COLLISIONS,
ALLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS
Although this Article is focused on the risk of collisions in narrow chan-
nels and fairways, that risk must be viewed in the larger context of risk man-
agement for the Marine Transportation System. The potential costs-
human, environmental and financial-of an accident in restricted waters can
be staggering. Collisions in narrow channels threaten not only the vessels,
crews, passengers and cargoes involved; they might also pollute or obstruct
the channel," perhaps closing a vital waterway to other marine traffic.'" At
1Id.
"Under the U.S. Supreme Court's rule in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 1928
A.M.C. 61 (1927), those who suffer purely economic losses from such an incident will be barred from
recovery. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. The Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1985 A.M.C. 1521 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc) (denying compensation for purely economic losses caused by a collision in the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet channel, resulting in closure of fisheries for nearly one month), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 943 (1986).
"Following the collision between the Zim Mexico III and the Lee III on February 21, 2004, the criti-
cal Southwest Pass route into the lower Mississippi River was completely closed for five days and lim-
ited to one-way traffic for several more days, while salvors worked to remove the Lee III wreckage. See
Crash Closes Mississippi River Indefinitely, USA Today, Feb. 22, 2004, available at http://www.usato-
day.com/news/nation/2004-02-22-ships-collidex.htm.
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the same time, provident maritime risk managers would caution against
overlooking the non-collision risks posed by vessel navigation in restricted
waters in our examination of collision prevention rules. Allisions-essen-
tially, collisions by vessels with fixed objects-and groundings also pose
grave risks. For example, allisions involving the M/V Summit Venture with
the Sunshine Skyway bridge in Tampa Bay, Florida, in 1980, the towboat
Mauvilla and her barge flotilla with an Amtrak railroad bridge in Alabama,
in 1993, the 2001 Brown Water V allision with the bridge leading to South
Padre Island, Texas, and the towboat Robert Y Love and her flotilla with the
Interstate 40 bridge over the Arkansas River near Webber Falls, Oklahoma,
in 2002, collectively resulted in over 100 fatalities and severe motor and rail
traffic disruption while regionally critical bridges were rebuilt." America
will not soon forget the 11 million gallon oil spill from the Exxon Valdez
after the laden tanker strayed outside the Prince William Sound channel and
grounded on Bligh Reef." In 1996, the tanker Sea Empress ran aground in
the Milford Haven channel in England, spilling over 20 million gallons
crude oil. That same year, the tanker Julie N allided with a bridge while tran-
siting a Portland, Maine channel, spilling 180,000 gallons of heating oil into
Casco Bay. These allision and grounding incidents remind us that collision
prevention is only part of the overall maritime risk assessment and manage-
ment challenge, and that collision prevention rules must be crafted in a way
that does not unreasonably increase non-collision risks."
Thirty-five motorists and bus passengers were killed when the 580 foot long M/V Summit Venture
rammed the Sunshine Skyway Bridge over Tampa Bay. In re Hercules Carriers, 566 F. Supp. 962, 1983
A.M.C. 2409 (MD. Fl. 1983). Forty-seven passengers and crew on the Amtrak "Sunset Limited" train were
killed when the tug Mauvilla (pushing six barges) struck the railroad bridge, knocking it out of alignment
and resulting in the passenger train running off the bridge. In re Amtrak "Sunset Limited" Train Crash in
Bayou Canot, Alabama, on September 22, 1993, 121 F. 3d 1421, 1997 A.M.C. 2962 (11th Cir. 1997).
Fourteen motorists were killed when the towboat Robert Y Love hit an Interstate 40 bridge near Webber
Falls, Oklahoma, causing itto collapse into the Arkansas River. In re Magnolia Transp. Co., 366 F. 3d 1153,
2004 A.M.C. 1249 (10th Cir. 2004). Eight motorists were killed when one of the hopper barges under tow
by the tug Brown Water V allided with the Queen Isabella Causeway Bridge leading to Padre Island, Texas.
See U.S. Coast Guard, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Allision between the
Barge Tow of the MV Brown Water V and the Queen Isabella Causeway Bridge on September 15, 2001, in
Port Isabel Texas, Resulting in Multiple Loss of Life, available at http://www.offsoundings.com/
WEB%20PDF/MVBROWN%20_WATER_V_v._CAUSEWAY.pdf.
"Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 553 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2008 A.M.C. 1521 (2008).
'Risk analysts concede that the Marine Transportation System will never be risk free; the cost would
be too great. As MIT researchers have pointed out, "[t]he challenge is not to minimize collisions. The
challenge is to minimize the sum of the cost of collisions and the cost of preventing collisions . . ." John
W. Devanney III, et al., Tanker Spills, Collisions and Groundings, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Sea Grant Program, MIT Sea Grant Report No. 79-14, 1979, NTIS Doc. PB299204, at 2-14. Accord
Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis ch. 3 (1970) (describing the
goals and sub-goals of accident law).
5January 2010
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A. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a systematic approach to risk identification, analysis and
management.20 Risk identification begins with an identification of the hazards
posed by a particular activity. It then turns to an examination of historical acci-
dent data, which are used to estimate the probabilities of accidents resulting
from those risks and the potential harm that would result.2 Risk management
analysts then select and implement appropriate risk elimination and reduction
measures. Marine risk management incorporates both internal measures
undertaken by the party engaged in the activity creating the risk and external
measures by others. Internal risk management measures can be voluntary or
required by law. The nautical rules of the road, including the Rule 9 narrow
channel rule, fall into the category of required internal risk management meas-
ures, the violation of which can lead to penalties and civil liability.
B. Narrow Channel Risks
The narrow channel rule can be viewed as an area-based collision pre-
vention measure, directed at a particular constellation of risks. The drafters
of the COLREGS and Inland Rules and their predecessors were apparently
convinced that the ordinary rules applicable to non-narrow water bodies did
not, by themselves, provide adequate protection against collision risks in
narrow channels and fairways. They therefore inserted in the COLREGS
and Inland Rules a special purpose rule to address the hazards unique to
those channels and fairways.22 Any interpretation of this risk management
'See generally International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
(IALA), Guidelines on Risk Management (Dec. 2000), at 19 ("areas needing control"), available at
http://wwwiala-aism.org/web/pages/publications/docpdf/guidelines/GUIDELI ll.pdf.
"A study of four U.S. ports found that the probabilities of collisions and groundings among com-
mercial vessels were nearly equal: one collision occurred in every 1,200 vessel transits and one ground-
ing occurred in every 1,300 vessel transits. Hauke L. Kite-Powell, et al. Formulation of a Model for Ship
Transit Risk: Final Report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sea Grant Program, MIT Sea Grant
Report No. 98-6, 1998, at 48. Tug and tow flotilla (called "barge trains" by the authors) accident rates
were generally higher than the rates for self-propelled vessels. Id.
'Some channels are so narrow they can only support one-way traffic. Under those circumstances, traf-
fic must be separated by time rather than space. Other channels might be called "quasi one-way" water-
ways. These very narrow waterways permit vessels to pass each other, but are too narrow for application of
a true "keep-to-starboard" approach. The "Panama Canal style" practice followed in these waters is some-
times described as the 'Texas two-step" or 'Texas chicken," in which vessels approaching head-on both
stay near the channel centerline until quite close, and then turn to starboard for a port-to-port passage. The
maneuver allows the vessels to make synergistic use of the hydrodynamic forces and pass each other with-
out running aground on the channel's outer edges. See Gray, supra note [4] at 98; John Bloom, Unsafe
Harbor, Texas Monthly (May 1979), at 82, 86; Nat'l Academy Press, Proc. 23rd Am. Towing Tank Conf.
(Robert G. Latorre, ed. 1992), at 26. With the recent widening of the Houston Ship Channel from 400 to
530 feet and the addition of barge lanes, the "chicken" approach should be less common there.
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rule should therefore begin with the nature of the risks posed by navigation
in narrow channels and how the rule seeks to mitigate those risks.
The principal factors that distinguish narrow channels and fairways from
other waterways are their physical characteristics and usage. The risks may
be posed by narrow and shallow waterway geometry, blind bends, sharp
turns, tide and river stage fluctuations, powerful and sometimes unpre-
dictable currents and the forces of hydrodynamic interaction. In congested
waters, the number of encounters between vessels increases, requiring ships
to pass frequently at close quarters. Additional risks may be posed by cross-
channel and converging traffic patterns, bridges that are unsafely designed or
negligently operated 24 and frequent dredging, fishing and barge fleeting oper-
ations in some areas. The growing number of vessels with drafts of 40 feet or
more and beams of 100 and even 180 feet, together with the financial and
environmental constraints on dredging channels to depths and widths ade-
quate for safe navigation, likely means the problem will worsen.25 The
increasing presence of recreational boats, many of which are operated by per-
sons unfamiliar with the collision regulations, and large and sometimes
unwieldy tug and tow flotillas exacerbates the problems in some waterways.
Studies by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Sea Grant
Program published in 197926 and 1996-199827 examined a number of physi-
"The hydrodynamic forces of interest include bow cushion and bank suction between moving ves-
sels and the banks or vertical "walls" of a box-shaped channel or canal caused by pressure differentials
and similar pressure-induced interaction between two adjacent vessels moving relative to each other.
Nat'1 Imagery & Mapping Agency (NIMA), The American Practical Navigator, Pub. No. 9 (2002), at
121-22; Richard A. Cahill, Collisions and Their Causes 93 (3d ed. 2002).
2 A joint study by the American Waterways Operators and U.S. Coast Guard found that 34 percent of
the bridge allisions that occurred between 1992 and 2001 took place at bridges that have been identified
by the Coast Guard as obstructions to navigation and candidates for alteration or removal under the
authority of the Truman-Hobbs Act. See Coast Guard-AWO Bridge Allision Work Group Report, May
21,2003, available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg5211/docs/BAWGfinal report.pdf.
'It is not clear whether the backlog in dredging is due to funding constraints. In 1986, Congress
enacted the Harbor Maintenance Revenue Act of 1986, imposing an ad valorem tax on commercial
imports and exports to defray the cost of dredging and port maintenance. See Water Resources
Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, tit. XIV, Nov. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 4082, 4266, codified at
33 U.S.C. § 2238 & 26 U.S.C. § 4461. In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act's tax on exports
unconstitutional. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 1998 A.M.C. 1403 (1998)
(explaining, however, that a user fee based on the value of services provided to a ship would not violate
the Constitution). The tax continues to be collected on imports and on domestic cargo. The tax current-
ly generates about $1.4 billion a year for the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, but only about $700 mil-
lion is spent on harbor maintenance, resulting in a current surplus of $4.7 billion in the fund. See Great
Lakes Commission, Resolution: Reform of the Harbor Maintenance Tax and Harbor Maintenance Trust
Fund adopted Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.glc.org/about/resolutions/09/hmtf html.
"Devanney, supra note 19. The 1979 study was funded in part by a grant from National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Office of Sea Grant and was undertaken with the support of the
U.S. Department of Transportation's Transportation Systems Center. Id. at I-a, II.
Kite-Powell, supra note 21. The three-year study was funded by MIT Sea Grant, the U.S. Coast
Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Id. "Acknowledgments."
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cal and human factors associated with vessel collisions and groundings.2 8
Although neither study focused specifically on narrow channels or fairways,
or attempted to assess the effectiveness of alternative collision prevention
rule sets, the studies are exemplars of a reasoned approach to assessing and
managing narrow channel risk factors. For example, employing a physical
risk model grounded on Bayesian methodology,29 the 1998 study concluded
that casualties correlated with visibility conditions, the accuracy of naviga-
tion systems, vessel maneuverability and operator skills levels.' On the
other hand, the accuracy or adequacy of data on water depths and the state
of the tide were generally considered less of a factor." When used in con-
junction with channel design considerations (discussed in Part m below)
and restricted water collision case studies, the MIT reports provide a useful
starting point for assessing narrow channel collision avoidance measures.
C. Risk Management Measures for Narrow Channels and Fairways
Recognizing that navigable waterways are an indispensible component of
the U.S. Marine Transportation System, the federal government seeks to
manage the risks in maritime operations in those waters through measures
that include both services and regulatory requirements." Waterway services
include the installation of visual aids to navigation, like buoys and light-
houses; the Differential Global Positioning Systems (DGPS); nautical pub-
lications and charts, including those adapted to Electronic Chart Display
Information Systems (ECDIS); weather and hydrological data and forecasts,
including in some ports the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) Physical Oceanographic Real-Time System
2 In examining grounding incidents, the 1979 study distinguished ship navigation errors (believing
the vessel is in one location when it is actually in another) from ship 'conning' errors (knowing the ves-
sel's position but exercising poor judgment or skill in timing or executing a maneuver). Devanney, supra,
note 19, at 3-5.
'The model estimates the conditional probability of a collision or grounding given alternative values
for selected variables, including operator skill and training, topographic and environmental difficulty of the
transit, quality of operator's information and vessel maneuverability. Kite-Powell, supra, note 21 at 6-7.
"Id. ch. 3 and pp. 48-49. Ship maneuverability is a function of several factors, including the vessel's
length/beam ratio, number and size of rudders, power/tonnage ratio, windage and minimum bare steerage
speed (which can be as high as 8 knots for some newer container ships). See generally Gray, supra, note 4
at 94; IMO, Standards for Ship Maneuverability, IMO Res. MSC.137(76) (Dec. 4,2002), Annex 6.
"The 1996 Intertanko Port and Terminal Safety Initiative discussion paper was less sanguine about
the adequacy and accuracy of hydrographic data in U.S. ports and harbors and the implications for ensur-
ing minimum safe vessel under-keel clearance. For a summary of the papers, see William 0. Gray,
Intertanko's U.S. Ports and Terminals Safety Initiative (PTS): A Discussion Paper, available at
http://www.harbourmarine.com/news-articles/pdfs/01-029.pdf.
"See generally The Marine Transportation System and the Federal Role, supra, note 3, ch. 1.
Vol. 41, No. 1
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(PORTS);" and vessel traffic management services. Where nature failed to
provide navigable waterways that are deep enough, wide enough or straight
enough to support the needs of commerce or national security, the govern-
ment may also provide a variety of channel design, construction and main-
tenance activities, and in some areas, construct and operate dams and locks.'
Services are seldom adequate by themselves to reduce risks to desired lev-
els. Growing traffic volumes and trends toward larger, and in some cases
less maneuverable, vessels strain the capacity of many U.S. waterways, both
natural and designed," requiring governments to prescribe regulatory meas-
ures to manage navigation risks. 6
Federal and state laws generally require certain vessels navigating in des-
ignated waters to embark local pilots37 and to employ only "able seamen" for
helm duties under some circumstances." In U.S. navigable waters, the
Navigation Safety Regulations (NSRs) prescribe detailed equipment and
operating requirements." The regulations require that tankers have two
licensed deck officers on the bridge" and that the conning officer be famil-
iar with the comparative proportions of the vessel and the channel, the ten-
dency of the vessel to squat and the effect of reduced under-keel clearance
on the vessel's maneuverability.4 Channels and fairways may also fall with-
"PORTS is a decision support tool that integrates real-time environmental observations, forecasts and
other geospatial information. It measures and disseminates observations and predictions of water levels,
currents, salinity, and meteorological parameters that mariners need to navigate safely. See National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Physical Oceanographic Real-Time System
(PORTS), available at http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/ports.html.
"See John McPhee, The Control of Nature (1989) (giving a sense of the struggle between the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River system, which began short-
ly after the War of 1812).
"See Gray, supra, note 4, at 94-95.
"Risk assessment and management analysts remind us that not every risk must be tolerated, nor must
they be accommodated. Before we rush to further alter the nation's waterways or rewrite the rules to
adapt to new uses of the inland waterways we would do well to carefully consider the wisdom of accept-
ing some risks. Not every channel should be navigated and not every vessel must be accommodated at
every port. There is nothing inevitable about the arrival of ships with 50 foot drafts and 180 foot beams
in all U.S. seaports, or of 1,200 foot towboat-barge combinations snaking their way through the sinuosi-
ties of every inland river.
"46 U.S.C. §§ 8501-8503 (2006).
"See 46 U.S.C. § 8702(d) (2006), which requires an able seaman (not merely an "ordinary" seaman)
on the helm on U.S. vessels of 100 or more gross tons in narrow or crowded waters during low visibility.
The more demanding requirements for certification as an "able" seaman are set out in 46 CF.R. § 12.05.
"33 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2009). The NSRs are complemented by the STCW Convention and Code and sev-
eral related resolutions by the IMO Assembly. See Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchstanding of Seafarers ["STCW Convention"], Dec. 1, 1978, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. EE, 1361
U.N.T.S. 190; 1995 Amendments to the Annex of the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, Sen. Exec. Doc. EE 96-1, C.TI.A. No. 7624; IMO, Guidelines
for Voyage Planning, IMO Res. A.893(21) (Nov. 25, 1999).
"33 C.F.R. § 164.13(c) (2009).
"33 CF.R. § 164.11(p) (2009).
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in a traffic separation scheme or vessel traffic service, triggering additional
requirements, and vessels may be required to maintain a listening watch on
a radiotelephone frequency designated for bridge-to-bridge communications
and to carry Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders. The NSRs
extend beyond deep-draft vessels. Following several high profile casualties
involving tugs and tows, Congress and the Coast Guard prescribed a num-
ber of tug equipment, operations and operator training and qualification
standards. Tugs must now be equipped with radar and AIS, and tug opera-
tors must be trained in their use.42
D. The Narrow Channel or Fairway Rule
The modem narrow channel rule has its roots in the customary practices
of mariners, local harbor regulations and early court decisions the incorpo-
rated the customs and local rules into the applicable standard of care, the
breach of which constituted negligence.43 Beginning in the late nineteenth
century, the court-adopted rules were codified into statutes, treaties and reg-
ulations that were collectively referred to as the "rules of the road."" The
current versions of the narrow channel rule is found in Rule 9 of the 1972
COLREGS, as amended, and in the 1980 Inland Rules, as amended.
Rule 9 responds to the collision risks unique to the world's increas-
ingly challenged narrow waterways. Like internationally recognized
Ships' Routing Systems45 and Regulated Navigation Areas in the United
#33 C.F.R. § 164.72 - .82 (2009).
The history of the narrow channel rule is detailed in John W. Griffin, The American Law of
Collision § 36 (1949).
"Early versions of the narrow channel rule were much shorter. The 1890 version of what was then
Article 25 simply directed that "In narrow channels every steam vessel shall, when it is safe and practi-
cable, keep to that side of the fairway or mid-channel which lies on the starboard side of such vessel."
See Act of Aug. 19,1890, ch. 802, § 1, art. 25,26 Stat. 322,327 (superseded). See also Raymond Farwell,
Nautical Rules of the Road 309 (1941) (reprinting the rule). The 1948 version, now called "Rule" 25,
substituted the phrase "power-driven vessel" for "steam vessel" and added a requirement for power-driv-
en vessels to sound a whistle signal when approaching a bend and a duty for power-driven vessels of less
than 65 feet not to hamper the safe passage of a vessel which can safely navigate only inside such chan-
nel. See Act of Oct. 11, 1951, ch. 495, Rule 25, 65 Stat. 408, 419 (superseded). See also Raymond
Farwell & Alfred Prunski, Nautical Rules of the Road 412-13 (3d ed. 1954) (reprinting the rule). The
1960 rules added a note which, by implication, indicated that the narrow channel rule in Rule 25 applied
in all conditions of visibility. See Pub. L. No. 88-131, Sept. 24, 1963,77 Stat. 194, 205 (superseded). See
also Alfred Prunski, Farwell's Nautical Rules of the Road 425 (4th ed. 1971) (reprinting 1960
International Rules, Part D "Preliminary' statement).
4The IMO recognizes the following ships' routing systems: traffic separation schemes, separation
zones or lines, traffic lanes, roundabouts, inshore traffic zones, two-way-routes, recommended tracks,
deep water routes, precautionary areas, areas to be avoided, established direction of traffic flow and rec-
ommended direction of traffic flow. See Int'l Maritime Org., Ships' Routing, Foreword (9th ed. 2008).
See also 33 C.F.R. § 167.5 (defining the terms under U.S. law).
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States ,46 Rule 9 prescribes a rule set tailored to the unique risks in the
"designated" areas, in the belief that the default rules applicable gener-
ally to other waterways do not, by themselves, provide an adequate level
of safety.47 Located in Subpart I of Part B of the COLREGS and Inland
Rules, Rule 9 applies in all conditions of visibility.48 In some respects,
Rule 9 supplements the other steering and sailing rules by, for example,
requiring certain vessels to keep to the starboard side of the channel. In
other respects, Rule 9 displaces the generally applicable steering and
sailing rules by requiring certain categories of vessels that might other-
wise have a navigation priority under the rules to yield that priority to
vessels that can safely navigate only in the channel. The Inland Rules
version of the rule provides:
Inland Rule 9. Narrow Channels
(a) A vessel proceeding along the course of a narrow channel or fair-
way shall keep as near to the outer limit of the channel or fairway
which lies on her starboard side as is safe and practicable. Notwith-
standing paragraph (a)(i) and Rule 14 (a), a power-driven vessel oper-
ating in narrow channels or fairways on the Great Lakes, Western
Rivers, or waters specified by the Secretary, and proceeding down-
bound with a current shall have the right-of-way over an upbound ves-
sel, shall propose the manner and place of passage, and shall initiate
the maneuvering signals prescribed by Rule 34(a)(i), as appropriate.
The vessel proceeding upbound against the current shall hold as nec-
essary to permit safe passing.
(b) A vessel of less than 20 meters in length or a sailing vessel shall not
impede the passage of a vessel that can safely navigate only within a
narrow channel or fairway.
"U.S. Regulated Navigation Areas (RNAs) are promulgated under authority of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act. See 33 CF.R. § 165.9(b) (2009). An RNA is a "water area within a defined
boundary for which regulations for vessels navigating within the area have been established" under 33
CF.R. pt. 165. See 33 C.F.R. § 165.10 (2009). The authority has been used quite broadly in some areas.
For example, all of the navigable waters within the First Coast Guard District (the New England states)
are deemed an RNA. See 33 C.F.R. § 165.100 (2009).
"The corollary is that the Rule 9 scheme is not well suited for waters that are not narrow channels or
fairways. The circumstances that render a waterway a narrow channel or fairway are the legally suffi-
cient factual conditions for application of Rule 9 and therefore are not themselves "special circum-
stances" which might justify a departure of the rules under Rule 2(b).
"Part B of the COLREGS and Inland Rules-the "steering and sailing rules"-is divided into three
subparts: the rules in Subpart I apply to vessels in any conditions of visibility. Those in Subpart II apply
only when vessels are in sight of one another. Subpart III applies to vessels in restricted visibility.
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(c) A vessel engaged in fishing shall not impede the passage of any
other vessel navigating within a narrow channel or fairway.
(d) A vessel shall not cross a narrow channel or fairway if such cross-
ing impedes the passage of a vessel which can safely navigate only
within that channel or fairway.49 The latter vessel shall use the danger
signal prescribed in Rule 34(d) if in doubt as to the intention of the
crossing vessel."
(e) In a narrow channel or fairway when overtaking, the power-driven
vessel intending to overtake another power-driven vessel shall indicate
her intention by sounding the appropriate signal prescribed in Rule
34(c) and take steps to permit safe passing. The power-driven vessel
being overtaken, if in agreement, shall sound the same signal and may,
if specifically agreed to [,j take steps to permit safe passing. If in doubt
she shall sound the danger signal prescribed in Rule 34(d) This Rule
does not relieve the overtaking vessel of her obligation under Rule
13.5
(f) A vessel nearing a bend or an area of a narrow channel or fairway
where other vessels may be obscured by an intervening obstruction
shall navigate with particular alertness and caution and shall sound the
appropriate signal prescribed in Rule 34(e).
(g) Every vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case permit, avoid
anchoring in a narrow channel.
"See also Inland Rule 15(b), which provides that on the Great Lakes, Western Rivers and waters des-
ignated by the Secretary, a power-driven vessel crossing a "river" shall keep out of the way of a power-
driven vessel ascending or descending the "river." Rule 15(b) applies only to vessels on the listed waters
and when the vessels are in sight of one another. Rule 15(b) applies only to power-driven vessels cross-
ing a "river," which may or may not be a narrow channel and leaves out narrow channels and fairways
not within a river. When it does apply, Rule 15(b) imposes a duty not merely to avoid impeding the other
vessel, but to "keep out of the way."
In explaining Inland Rule 9, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation stated:
Rule 9(d) is similar to the 72 Colregs and is essentially a new rule in our inland waters. It
will have wide application in harbor channels and river areas. It recognizes the problems
experienced by mariners in narrow channels-currents, congestion, restricted maneuver-
ability due to lower speeds, and other similar impediments. This "stay-clear commandment"
for the crossing vessel is similar to the existing Western Rivers Rule 19, which is restricted
to tugs with tows.
S. Rep. No. 96-979, Sept. 22, 1980, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code & Cong. Admin News 7068, 7078.
Congress's characterization of the duty not to impede as a "stay-clear commandment" acknowledges that
the duty is more than merely a measure to prevent collisions. It imposes a requirement not to interfere
with the navigation of the channel-bound vessel. The commandment can be violated even if no collision
results from a failure to "stay clear."
"Although Rules 9(e) and 9(f) purport to apply in all conditions of visibility, maneuvering whistle
signals are not sounded in restricted visibility when vessels are not in sight of one another. See Rule 34(a)
of the COLREGS and Inland Rules.
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Rule 9 does not by its terms legally require a vessel to follow a narrow
channel or fairway. Vessels that do so, however, are instructed on how to
behave in the channel. Rule 9 also gives such vessels a limited "priority"
over crossing, fishing, sailing and small vessels. Where a conflict arises
between application of Rule 9 and one of the situation-specific rules in Part
B's Subpart I or Subpart III, the rule makers sometimes subordinate one
rule to another through the use of "notwithstanding" clauses."
The Rule 9 narrow channel or fairway rule is similar in some respects to
Rule 10 applicable to Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS). Both apply to all
vessels in all conditions of visibility. When they apply, both rules impose a
number of obligations on vessels. However, in contrast to the narrow chan-
nel rule, the Rule 10 TSS rule is clear in its application: it applies to TSSs
that have been pre-designated by a government authority and then published
and charted." The mariner is not left to come to his or her own conclusion
on whether the waters do or do not fall within the ambit of Rule 10. Instead,
the chart, coast pilot, sailing direction, port guide, VTS users' guide or other
publication will provide notice of the TSS designation.' By contrast, pre-
designation of narrow channels or fairways where Rule 9 applies is the
exception, not the rule." For most of the 25,000 miles of commercially nav-
igable channels in the United States, the mariner is left to determine which
are narrow channels for purposes of Rule 9, and must do so without a defi-
nition or published criteria for making that determination.
1. What is a Narrow Channel or Fairway under Rule 9?
Rule 9 applies only in narrow channels or fairways." However, neither the
COLREGS nor the Inland Rules (nor their predecessors) define "narrow
channel or fairway." Courts faced with ascertaining the phrase's meaning
have held that whether a particular waterway is a narrow channel or fairway
"See, e.g., COLREGS, supra note 6, Rule 13(a) (overtaking rule); see also id. Rule 18, chapeau
("[except where Rules 9, 10 and 13 otherwise provide . . ."). In the absence of specific internal guidance
in the rules, conflicts may be resolved by application of the lex specialis derogat legi generali canon,
which generally provides that in cases of conflict a specific rule (Rule 9) controls over a general rule.
"See, e.g., COLREGS, supra, note 6, Rule 10(a).
"TSSs adopted by the IMO are listed in the IMO's Ships' Routing publication. See supra, note 45.
"In the United States, San Francisco Bay is a notable exception. See infra, note 164, and accompa-
nying text.
"The rules of the road provide definitions for everything from "restricted visibility" to a "vessel con-
strained by her draft," and set out twelve factors for use by radar equipped vessels to determine "safe
speed," but they provide no similar help for the mariner in determining which waterways are narrow
channels or fairways for purposes of applying Rule 9.
"Whether the collision prevention scheme prescribed by Rule 9 could be incorporated by reference
into a Regulated Navigation Area (RNA) even though the waterway where the RNA applies is not a nar-
row channel or fairway is discussed below. See infra, note 161 and accompanying text.
14 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce Vol. 41, No. 1
for purposes of applying the narrow channel rule is a mixed question of fact
and law." The Coast Guard applies the same "mixed question" test in
mariner license suspension and revocation adjudications that involve alleged
violations of Rule 9.9 In making their waterway status determination, courts
sometimes consider testimony by expert witnesses familiar with the actual
use of the channel."
Mixed questions of fact and law are questions in which the facts are
admitted or established by evidence, the rule of law is undisputed or deter-
mined and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the legal standard.' Such
questions frequently arise in collision litigation involving allegations of fault
under the rules of the road.62 Because most collision cases are tried to the
bench under the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction, the legal, factual and
mixed questions relevant to a "narrow channel" question would all be deter-
mined by the court. Where, however, the case is tried to a jury under the say-
"Harbor Towing Corp. v. The Reliance, 211 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Va. 1963). Although courts are sel-
dom explicit about how the burden of proof on a waterway's status is allocated, the issue usually arises
in collision litigation when one party asserts that the other party violated Rule 9 and that the violation
constitutes causative fault. Under those circumstances, the party asserting the violation as the basis of a
claim or defense would bear the burden of proving the waterway's status by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
"See, e.g., U.S. Coast Guard, Decision on Appeal No. 2519 (1991) (holding that a segment of the
Colorado River in Arizona that was 150-200 feet wide was not a narrow channel, after explaining that
the Rule 9 application question is decided by the "peculiar facts of each situation"). Coast Guard
Commandant and Vice Commandant Decisions on Appeal are available through Westlaw (database: U.S.
Federal Materials; Other Administrative and Executive Materials; Administrative Materials Organized
by Area of Practice; Maritime Law).
'The question falls within the provisions for expert testimony in Fed R. Evid. 702-705. Under Fed
R. Evid. 704(a), the expert would not be barred from offering an opinion on the ultimate issue (i.e., "Is
X a narrow channel or fairway?"). In the United Kingdom, the admiralty court may look to the advice of
its nautical assessors. But see Ian P.A. Stitt, The COLREGS-Time for a Rewrite? 55 J. Nay. 419, 429
(2002) (concluding that such questions should be referred to a "panel of experienced mariners" rather
than just two nautical assessors).
"Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19, (1982). A lower court's conclusions on ques-
tions of law are reviewed de novo by the appellate court, while the trial court's findings of fact are
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 52(a); In re Luhr Bros., Inc., 325
F. 3d 681, 684, 2003 A.M.C. 1005 (5th Cir. 2003). The standard of review for mixed questions of law
and fact has been the source of conflict in the circuit courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "def-
erential review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court is
'better positioned' than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate scruti-
ny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine." Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,
233 (1991) (citation omitted). But see Luhr Bros., 325 F. 3d at 684 ("[w]e review legal conclusions and
mixed questions of law and fact following a bench trial de novo"); Campbell v. Merit Systems Protection
Bd., 27 F. 3d 1560, 1565-67 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that policy alone determines where the court
draws the line between deferential and de novo review).
'
2Examples include: Was the vessel keeping a proper look-out under Rule 5? Was the vessel travel-
ing at a "safe speed" under Rule 6? Was the, vessel "restricted in her ability to maneuver" under Rule
3(g)? In contrast to the more general "narrow channel" question, the answer to each of these three ques-
tions turns on the particular vessel and circumstances involved.
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ing-to-suitors provision," factual and mixed questions are for the jury.64 The
legal rules applicable to the mixed question whether a waterway is a narrow
channel or fairway for purposes of Rule 9 would be provided by the court's
instructions, as they are for jury trials involving questions of negligence,
unseaworthiness and proximate causation.5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit notes that the analysis of
mixed questions of fact and law actually involve three distinct steps: (1)
establishment of the basic, primary or historical facts, (2) determination of
the applicable rule of law and (3) application of the law to the facts.' These
three steps are cast in the form of the commonly used syllogism in Section
II.A of this Article. Where the issue is whether a waterway is a narrow chan-
nel or fairway, the "rule of law" to be applied to the facts will be drawn from
the treaty (for waterways falling under the COLREGS6I) or the statute (for
Inland Rule waters). In either case, the meaning of the phrase "narrow chan-
nel or fairway" is a question of law and will be interpreted according to rules
and canons applicable to legal texts and not those for rules of the common
law.
"'he saving-to-suitors clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) "saves" to litigants in cases falling under fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction "all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Where a litigant's in
personam admiralty claim falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court or the diversity of citi-
zenship or federal question jurisdiction of the federal district court, the claimant may obtain a jury trial.
Additionally, Congress has provided a jury trial right for certain admiralty cases arising on the Great
Lakes and their connecting waters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (2006). The Seventh Amendment provides that
"no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law." U.S. Const. Amend. VII.
"Given the specialized nature of the narrow channel inquiry and the admiralty courts' historically
dominate role, the court might be justified in determining such questions even where other issues are
tried to the jury. Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (analyzing the
respective roles of judge and jury in a patent infringement action and concluding that "when an issue
'falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at
times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of sound administration of justice, one judicial actor
is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question."') (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104, 114 (1985)).
"Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S.S. Lines, 360 F.2d 774, 777, 1966 A.M.C. 1165 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.)
(explaining, in a cargo damage cases brought under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act that, while negli-
gence determinations must be characterized as a question of fact when tried to a jury, it is a question of
law when tried to a judge, because in the latter case, there are no constitutional considerations to over-
ride concerns about uniformity of result), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966).
"United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (adopting a "functional
analysis" for determining the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 824 (1984).
"Where U.S. courts are applying COLREGS Rule 9 they must be mindful of the fact that the rule is
part of a widely adopted international convention, the interpretation of which should be harmonized
among the parties to the convention. Idiosyncratic local interpretations must be avoided, or uniformity
and predictability under the COLREGS will suffer. Garrett v. Higgenbotham, 800 F2d 1537, 1539 (11th
Cir. 1986) ("courts ought to be extremely slow to tamper with this sensitive, regulatory system").
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Whether interpreting the treaty (COLREGS) or the statute (the Inland
Navigation Rules Act) to determine the governing rule of law, the first step
is to determine whether the terms used have a plain or ordinary meaning. If
they do, the court's obligation is to apply the statute as written by the legis-
lature according to its terms. " Where, however, the terms are ambiguous or
otherwise lack a plain or ordinary meaning,9 the court must construe the
terms before it can apply them to the facts of the case. The phrase "narrow
channel or fairway" can be disaggregated in two different ways. The first
would be to determine the individual meanings ascribed by the rule's
drafters to the words "channel," "fairway" and "narrow." The second
approach would be to take the term "narrow channel" as a single indivisible
term thereby avoiding the need to separately define "channel" and "narrow."
Under the second approach, the term "fairway" must still be defined and it
must be further determined whether the adjective "narrow" also modifies the
term fairway. The courts' narrow channel cases are not entirely consistent in
their choice of approach or in distinguishing between channels and fairways.
The term "channel" by itself has several accepted meanings in marine
navigation usage.'o They include "the part of a body of water deep enough
for navigation through an area otherwise not suitable" and "the deepest part
of a stream, bay or strait, through which the main current flows." The defi-
nition adds that the channel is "usually marked by a single or double line of
buoys" and sometimes by ranges."72 However, the term is not limited to
channels buoyed by the Coast Guard or maintained by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE).
In determining whether a waterway is a narrow channel, the courts con-
sider the waterway's physical characteristics and the dimensions of the ves-
'Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 484 (1917) ("It is elementary that the meaning of a statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and
if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function
of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.") (citations omitted). See also Oliver W. Holmes Jr.,
The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Hary. L Rev. 417, 419 (1898-1899) ("We do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.").
'The Court in Caminetti cautioned, however, that "[w]here the language is plain and admits of no
more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion." 242 U.S. at 484. For additional views on statutory construction see
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction (6th ed. 2000) (multiple volumes); William N.
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 351
(1990).
'See American Practical Navigator, supra, note 23, at 735 (Glossary).
"By "double line," the definition refers to the common U.S. practice of placing distinctively colored
buoys on each side of many channels, with red buoys on the right side when entering from sea and green
buoys on the left side.
""Range," in this application, refers to visual aids to navigation used by the mariner to determine when
the vessel is in the center of the channel. See American Practical Navigator, supra note 23, at 64-65.
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sels using the waterway." In addition to the waterway's depth and width, the
courts consider other risk factors, including the presence of dangers to nav-
igation, currents and bends or turns.74 Because the physical characteristics of
both the waterway and the vessels using it are considered in determining
whether a channel is a narrow channel, generalizations about what widths
are considered "narrow" can be misleading. A channel of a certain width and
depth might be deemed "narrow" when commonly used by deep draft mer-
chant or naval vessels or large tug and barge flotillas, 5 but not when a chan-
nel of similar dimensions is used only by small fishing vessels or pleasure
craft. By way of illustration, one court applied the narrow channel rule to a
2,000 foot wide waterway. 6 Courts have also held that certain named water
bodies, like the Houston Ship Channel and San Francisco's Golden Gate,
fall within the rule.'
The test commonly applied by the courts to determine whether a water-
way is a narrow channel also considers the character of the navigation use
to which the waterway is put." The rule has historically been limited to bod-
ies of water customarily navigated by vessels traveling in opposite direc-
tions (i.e., two-way waterways)." Accordingly, turning basins and harbors
where traffic commonly runs up, down and across the channel will likely not
be subject to the narrow channel rule."o On the other hand, the presence of
crossing traffic, even frequent crossing traffic, does not preclude a finding
that a waterway qualifies as a narrow channel.
"Maritrans Operating Partners, L.P. v. The Faith I, 800 F. Supp. 133, 140, 1993 A.M.C. 377 (D.NJ.
1992); Williamson Leasing Co., Inc. v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. La.
1985).
"Weathers Towing, Inc. v. The Herman Pott, 570 F.2d 1294, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1978) (relevant cir-
cumstances considered by the court included the river stage, a strong current, the presence of a sandbar
and fact that the channel curved 180 degrees at that location).
"One collision case arose out of a meeting situation in the lower Mississippi River involving two tug
and barge flotillas, one of which was 1,480 feet long and 140 feet wide, and the other was 1,269 feet long
and 175 feet wide. See Flowers Transp., Inc. v. American River Transp. Co., 485 F. Supp. 731, 1982
A.M.C. 2689 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
"See Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Transmaritima Sarda Italnavi Flotte Riunite S.p.A., 1981 A.M.C. 415
(SD.N.Y. 1980) (applying narrow channel rule, without analysis, to a section of the Ambrose Channel
that was 2,000 feet wide and 40 feet deep). Another court assumed, again without analysis, that Rule 9
applied in a collision between two towboats in a section of the Mississippi River where the navigation
channel was 2,000 feet wide. See Inland River Towing, Inc. v. American Commercial Barge Line Co.,
143 F. Supp.2d 646, 2001 A.M.C. 2521 (N.D. Miss. 2000).
"See, e.g., Elcarriers, Inc. v. Embiricos, 174 F. Supp. 929, 1959 A.M.C. 1782 (SD.N.Y. 1959)
(Houston Ship Channel is a narrow channel); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Union Oil Co., 4 F.2d 551, 1924
A.M.C. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1924) (the Golden Gate in San Francisco Bay is a narrow channel).
"Tempest v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 59,63, 1968 A.M.C. 926 (ED. Va. 1967).
'Harbor Towing Corp. v. The Reliance, 211 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Va. 1963).
"Skibs A/S Siljestad v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 215 F. Supp. 667,681-83, 1963 A.M.C. 2280 (S D.N.Y.
1963); The No. 4-The C.W. Morse, 161 F. 847 (2d Cir. 1908).
18 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce
A "fairway" is defined in navigation circles as "the main thoroughfare of
shipping in a harbor or channel" or "the middle of a channel."" For the
mariner trying to interpret and apply Rule 9, those definitions are not very
helpful. In truth, the terms "channel" and "fairway" overlap, and may even
be used interchangeably, depending on regional custom and usage.82 In the
United States, fairways are generally established by government authority."
In England, where a particular regulatory regime applies to a prescribed fair-
way within, but narrower than, a narrow channel, the two terms must be dis-
tinguished.84 In Rule 9 cases, U.S. courts have determined that the adjective
"narrow" modifies both channel and fairway. Thus Rule 9 applies only to
narrow fairways, not all fairways. It is therefore important to distinguish
fairways within the meaning of Rule 9 from offshore "safety fairways" pre-
scribed in 33 C.F.R. part 1665 or other regulatory fairways designated by the
Coast Guard district commanders in 33 C.F.R. part 162.6 Although some
safety or regulatory fairways might meet the test of a "narrow fairway"
under Rule 9, it is clear that some do not. For example, a two-mile-wide
safety fairway in the Gulf of Mexico running between offshore oil and gas
structures was held not to fall within the narrow channel rule, and vessels
using this voluntary shipping lane do not acquire any special rights."
2. The "Keep-to-Starboard" Rule
The Rule 9 requirement for all vessels following the course of a narrow
channel or fairway to "keep as near to the outer limit of the channel or fair-
way which lies on her starboard side as is safe and practicable" is one of the
most important collision prevention measures in Rule 9. Its importance
derives from its potential to eliminate or at least substantially reduce the
incidence of "conflicting action" collisions between vessels meeting in nar-
row channels or fairways. Commenting on collision risk in narrow channels,
a leading authority put it this way:
"American Practical Navigator, supra, note 23, at 761. Red and white vertically striped "fairway
buoys" (also called mid-channel buoys) mark the fairway, indicating safe water on both sides of the buoy.
Id.
"The American Jurist-The Claycarrier, [1958] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 423, 434 (Adm.), [1959] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 53 (CA.).
"33 C.F.R. pts. 162, 166 (2009).
"The Koningin Juliana, [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 353, 362 (CA.).
"See 33 C.F.R. § 166.105(a) (2009) (defining safety fairway).
"See, e.g., 33 CF.R. §§ 162.65, 162.75(b)(2), 162.90 (2009) (delegating authority to Coast Guard
district commanders to designate fairways).
"Zim Israel Nay. Co., Ltd. v. Special Carriers, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 581,587, 1986 A.M.C. 2016 (ED.
La. 1985), modified, 800 F2d 1392, 1988 A.M.C. 2110 (5th Cir. 1986). It should be noted that the Coast
Guard had not exercised its authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(5)(A) to declare that Rule 9 applied to
the fairway.
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One of the most dangerous situations that can confront a vessel is meeting
another in a narrow channel. By definition, a narrow channel allows only a
restricted amount of water in which to effect the meeting, so that the ships are
not only thrust into close quarters but any deviation from the prescribed
course can immediately place the vessels in extremis."
If vessels were left free to choose their lateral position in narrow channels
and fairways, operators would find themselves unable to predict the relative
position of oncoming vessels they "meet" in the channel (imagine the chaos
on two-lane highways if cars were free to drive in either lane until they meet
another car), particularly in channels where vision is obstructed by bends.
The 1979 MIT study identified so many collision cases involving vessels
approaching each other nearly end-on, but slightly to starboard (i.e., to the
right) of each other, the researchers labeled the result of this dangerous sce-
nario the "modal collision."" Collision results under these circumstances
when the operator of one vessel concludes in his or her mind that, although
there is no risk of collision, just to be safe the operator should turn the ves-
sel to port (i.e., to the left) to increase the starboard-to-starboard passing dis-
tance. The operator of the second vessel, concluding that risk of collision
does in fact exist, follows the mandate of Rule 14 and turns to starboard (to
the right) in order to pass safely port-to-port. The two conflicting turns nul-
lify each other, resulting in collision.'
When followed,9' the keep-to-starboard rule reduces the probability that
vessels meeting in a narrow channel will find themselves in the "modal col-
lision" approach. By keeping to the right side of the channel, the vessels
should already be lined up to meet oncoming vessels port-to-port, as Rule 14
"Cahill, Collisions and Their Causes, supra, note 23, at 79. Captain Cahill goes on to warn that hydro-
dynamic interaction is a constant threat in any head-on meeting in a narrow channel and that cross cur-
rents and sharp bends can accentuate the hazards. Id.
"Devanney, supra, notel9, describes the modal collision (and then cites the 1956 Stockholm-Andrea
Doria collision as an example):
Well over half of all collisions involve two ships in an end-on or nearly end-on encounter,
proceeding at fairly substantial speeds in lousy visibility, aware of each other's presence
through radar, and maneuvering into a collision, often by one ship's 'reversing' the Rules of
the Road and the other not, and at the last moment throwing the throttle astern. This pattern
occurs so often we will call it the most likely or modal collision.
Id. at 2-10. See also John W. Trimmer, How to Avoid Huge Ships 47 (labeling the situation the "dance
of death").
"The 1979 Mr study concluded that the collisions resulted from a communication and coordination
problem, not a detection problem. Devanney, supra, note 19, at 2-16. Without communication and coor-
dination of collision avoidance actions, too many vessels approaching head-on took conflicting action.
"The predictability of the keep-to-starboard requirement is undermined by the point-bend custom and
Rule 9(a)(ii), where they apply. Moreover, the rule is not practicable in the "quasi one-way" channels,
where the only safe and practicable course is at or near the channel centerline. See supra, note 22 and
accompanying text.
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envisions (or, when not in sight, to avoid a turn to port for a vessel forward
of her beam, as Rule 19(d)(i) provides)." The rule requires vessels to "keep"
to the starboard outer limit, not merely to move over after sighting approach-
ing vessels or when they believe risk of collision exists.3 At the same time,
however, the "safe and practicable" qualification to the duty leaves some
room for interpretation' It should also be noted that even if a particular chan-
nel is held not to be a "narrow" channel under Rule 9, the Rule 2(a) "Rule of
Good Seamanship" might be invoked to require vessels navigating within the
channel to keep to the starboard side if safe and practicable."
3. Priorities Among Vessels in Narrow Channels or Fairways
Conflicting uses are common in congested waterways. Fishing, sailing and
recreational vessels often vie with commercial traffic for the limited naviga-
tion space, and crossing vessels are a serious concern to vessels navigating
narrow channels. Under the generally applicable steering and sailing rules
applicable to vessels in sight, fishing and sailing vessels would be accorded a
"priority"" over ordinary power-driven vessels ." Rule 9 of the COLREGS and
Inland Rules effectively reverses that priority when the power-driven vessel is
confined to a narrow channel. It does that through paragraphs 9(b), 9(c) and
9(d), which impose a "do not impede" risk management duty. Close inspec-
tion reveals a difference in wording between these three paragraphs in Rule 9.
Paragraph (b) of Rule 9, which applies to vessels less than 20 meters in length
and sailing vessels, is applicable only with respect to other vessels that "can
safely navigate only within a narrow channel or fairway." The same qualifi-
cation is used in the rule on crossing traffic in Rule 9(d). By contrast, Rule
"Rule 14 applies to vessels meeting head-on when in sight of one another. In times of restricted vis-
ibility, when the vessels are not in sight of one another, Rule 19 controls.
"The Mersey No. 30, [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 183, 190 (Adm.).
"See, e.g., Linehan v. United States Lines, Inc., 1979 A.M.C. 1557 (3d Cir. 1977); National Iranian
Tanker Co. N.V. v. The Dalzell No. 2,411 F2d 759, 1969 A.M.C. 1187 (2d Cir. 1969).
"Maritrans Operating Partners, L.P. v. The Faith I, 800 F. Supp. 133, 140, 1993 A.M.C. 377 (D.NJ.
1992). While it may be good seamanship to keep to the right in waters supporting two-way traffic, it is
doubtful that it is the ordinary practice of seamen (the language used in Rule 2(a)) to "keep as near to the
outer [starboard] limit" of such channels "as is safe and practicable" (as Rule 9(a) requires). Accordingly,
Rule 9(a) imposes a more restrictive requirement than do the Rule 2(a) "good seamanship" cases.
"The characterization of the relationship established by Rule 9 as a "priority" in the use of the chan-
nel instead of a "privilege" or a "right-of-way" is deliberate. Earlier versions of the rules classified ves-
sels as "privileged" and "burdened." Those terms have been replaced with "give-way" and "stand-on."
The rules are also very selective in their use of the phrase "right-of-way." See, e.g., Inland Rule 9(a)(ii).
"The priority "hierarchy" for vessels in sight of one another is set out in Rule 18, which requires
power-driven vessels to keep out of the way of sailing vessels and vessels engaged in fishing. However,
the chapeau for Rule 18 subordinates that hierarchy to three other rules, by attaching the qualification
"Except where Rules 9, 10 and 13 otherwise require..." Thus the priorities prescribed by Rule 9 displace
those in Rule 18.
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9(c), the rule applicable to vessels engaged in fishing, is broader. It extends the
fishing vessel's obligation not to impede to "any other vessel navigating with-
in a narrow channel or fairway."
When the rules impose a duty on one vessel not to impede the passage of
another, the nature and extent of that duty is now set out in Rule 8(f). It
states:
(i) A vessel which, by any of these Rules, is required not to impede the pas-
sage or safe passage of another vessel shall, when required by the circum-
stances of the case, take early action to allow sufficient sea-room for the safe
passage of the other vessel.
(ii) A vessel required not to impede the passage or safe passage of another ves-
sel is not relieved of this obligation if approaching the other vessel so as to
involve risk of collision and shall, when taking action, have full regard to the
action which may be required by the Rules of this Part.
(iii) A vessel the passage of which is not to be impeded remains fully obliged
to comply with the Rules of this Part when the two vessels are approaching
one another so as to involve risk of collision.
The duties not to "impede" in Rules 9(b), 9(c) and 9(d) do not confer "right-
of-way" status on the vessel following the channel. Rather, Rule 8(f)(i)
requires the vessel which is directed not to impede another to take early
action to ensure adequate sea-room for the other. Together, Rules 9 and 8(f)
advise all mariners, whether operating large or small craft, that vessels navi-
gating a narrow channel or fairway are legally deemed to be at a disadvan-
tage, and that the navigational situation between them and less restricted ves-
sels should be planned and executed so as not to impede the safe transit of the
less maneuverable vessel within the channel. So far as practicable, the vessel
directed not to impede the other must navigate in such a way as to avoid even
the development of a risk of collision. In the end, if a situation develops so
as to involve risk of collision, the vessel whose passage was not to be imped-
ed must comply with the steering and sailing rules applicable to the particu-
lar approach situation; however, Rule 8(f)(ii) makes it clear that the encroach-
ing vessel is not in any way relieved of her obligation not to impede the other.
In determining whether a given vessel "can safely navigate only within a
narrow channel or fairway," it will be relevant whether she meets the defi-
nition in COLREGS Rule 3(h) for a vessel constrained by her draft and is
displaying the appropriate lights or dayshape under Rule 28. It should be
noted, however, that the lights and dayshape prescribed by Rule 28 are per-
missive," and there is nothing in Rule 9 that indicates that the presence or
"COLREGS Rule 28 states that such vessels "may" display the lights or dayshape designated in the
rule.
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absence of such distinctive marks is dispositive of the vessels' rights and
obligations under Rule 9. Moreover, the COLREGS Rule 18 priority applies
only when vessels are in sight of one another, and because the definition of
a vessel "constrained by her draft" is broader than the class of vessels
"which can safely navigate only within" the narrow channel, the presence of
the identifying lights or dayshape should not be dispositive in Rule 9 deter-
minations. There is no distinctive light or dayshape provision for vessels
constrained by their draft in the U.S. Inland Rules, nor are such vessels
accorded preferential treatment solely by virtue of Rule 18. Nevertheless, in
waters governed by the U.S. Inland Rules, such a vessel may well qualify
for preferential treatment under Rule 9(b) and 9(d).
III
THE PROBLEM
If mariners-both professional and recreational-were asked to vote on
which of the rules of the road is the most confusing and complex, Rule 9
would surely be at or near the top of the list.9 Confusion begins with the
uncertainty of its application. The NTSB's concern with the lack of a defi-
nition of "narrow channel or fairway" or formal criteria to assist the mariner
in making such a determination is longstanding." A response to its recom-
mendation for an interpretive rule or some other guidance to help the "oper-
ator make the determination for himself and thereby assist him in applying
the rules of the road"o'0 is overdue. A second problem in Rule 9 (and in Rule
10, among others) concerns the poorly understood and too often ignored
duty on the part of some vessels not to impede the passage (or the "safe"
passage) of another vessel, and how that duty applies once risk of collision
between the vessels arises.'02 This second problem is exacerbated in the
waters falling under the Inland Rules by the absence of recognition for a
"vessel constrained by her draft" in the Inland Rules.
"Rule complexity and the potential for confusion can be "tested" in two ways. In the first, a typical
mariner's comprehension of the text of the rule is assessed by written examination. The second assesses
the typical mariner's ability to apply the rule correctly and in a reasonable amount of time in a variety of
scenarios. In the author's experience, Rule 9 confusion is common in both assessments.
"NTSB Recommendation M-82-32, supra note [10].
"Id.
"See Stitt, supra note 60, at 421 (arguing that the duty not to impede should be replaced with a duty
to "keep out of the way" of the other vessel).
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A. The Rule is Dangerously Uncertain in its Application
The rules of the road incorporate situation-based rules (rules for meeting,
crossing and overtaking approaches between vessels), environmental condi-
tion-based rules (rules applicable in conditions of restricted visibility), ves-
sel condition-based rules (e.g., vessels restricted in their ability to maneuver
or constrained by their draft) and area-based rules (Rules 9 and 10). An
"area-based" risk management rule that fails to define the area to which it
applies or to provide sufficient direction or guidance to operators to permit
them to timely and accurately determine the areas of application creates two
distinct dangers. The first is the danger that one or both of the operators on
board the approaching vessels will err in applying or failing to apply the
rule. The error may take the form of a "false positive" (concluding that the
waters fall under Rule 9 when in fact they do not) or a "false negative" (con-
cluding that the waters do not fall under Rule 9 when in fact they do). The
NTSB investigation into a collision between two towboats on the Ohio
River, one of which concluded the waterway was a narrow channel while the
other came to the opposite conclusion, demonstrates one potential conse-
quence of such rule ambiguity.'03 The second danger is that, even if both
operators ultimately reach the correct conclusion, the need to make the case-
by-case "Does Rule 9 apply here?" determination will increase the time nec-
essary for the operators to make a collision prevention decision and then to
execute that decision. The most obvious realization of either of these dan-
gers will be a collision between the vessels. A lesser, but still important, risk
to licensed mariners is the potential for official action against the mariner's
professional license for a mistaken application of Rule 9, even if the mistake
does not lead to a collision."
The problem presented to a mariner, an enforcement agency or the courts
faced with a Rule 9 applicability question can be brought into sharper focus
by casting the decision process in the form of a syllogism that draws on the
mixed fact-law approach introduced earlier and adds an unstated premise
"See NTSB MN/V Bruce Brown report, supra, note 10.
"A U.S. mariner's license may be suspended or revoked if the holder, while acting under authority
of the license, violated a law or regulation intended to promote marine safety (such as the rules of the
road) or committed an act of misconduct or negligence. See 46 U.S.C. § 7703 (2006). However, charg-
ing mariners for violating Rule 9 in waters that were not established as a "narrow channel or fairway"
before the alleged violation occurred seems inconsistent with the spirit of due process, even though the
constitutional "adequate notice" requirement strictly applies only in criminal cases. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) ("Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person
of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal, for no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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regarding the purpose of the rule.o' The components of the constructed syl-
logism are:
Major premise (implied, but unstated in Rule 9): the nature of the collision
risks presented in a narrow channel or fairway require a special collision pre-
vention rule.
Major premise (undefined by Rule 9): a narrow channel or fairway is a chan-
nel or fairway that has the following characteristics: 1, 2, 3... [Presently sup-
plied by the courts].
Minor premise: Waterway X is characterized by the following relevant facts ...
Conclusion: Therefore, Waterway X is/is not a narrow channel or fairway.
The importance of identifying the unstated major premise will not be lost on
mariners, most of whom view the rules of the road through a functional lens.
The more it appears to professional mariners that the narrow channel rule
does not "fit" the waterway, the less likely they are to conclude on their own
that the rule applies to that waterway. The "rule of law" in the major prem-
ise forms the basis for the court's conclusions of law.'" The narrow channel
rule's textual basis means that its interpretation will be governed by princi-
ples of treaty (COLREGS) or statutory (Inland Rules) interpretation. At the
same time, the terms should be construed consistently with the unstated
premise (the purpose behind the rule). The minor premise comprises the rel-
evant characteristics of the waterway as established by the court's findings
of fact.' The conclusion, a mixed question of law and fact, follows when
the facts found to have been established by the court satisfy or fail to satis-
fy the minimum necessary conditions prescribed by the rule.'0
B. The Rule 9 Duties "Not to Impede" Are Too Often Misunderstood and
Ignored
The rule drafters who incorporated the duty not to impede in Rules 9(b),
9(c) and 9(d) are to be commended for their attempt to mitigate common and
"'See supra, note 66. Justice O.W. Holmes often referred to the "inarticulate major premise" in legal
syllogisms. See Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L Rev. 457, 465 (1897) ("Behind
the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds,
often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole
proceeding."). See also Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, supra, note 68, at 420 ("although
practical men generally prefer to leave their major premises inarticulate, yet even for practical purposes
theory generally turns out [to be] the most important thing in the end").
"A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See supra, note 61.
"'In the bench trials common to admiralty, the court's findings of fact win be set aside on appeal only
if "clearly erroneous." Id.
"The standard of review on appeal for mixed questions of law and fact varies. Id.
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dangerous navigational conflicts in narrow channels. However, few
mariners believe those rules have been effective in achieving that goal,
despite the later amendments to Rule 8 which sought to clarify the meaning
of the duty.'" After talking to "well over 1,000 masters and officers," noted
Australian rules of the road expert Captain Roger Syms concluded that the
duty not to impede is neither understood nor heeded by the majority of oper-
ators."o Problems in applying Rule 9(b) and 9(d) are even greater under the
U.S. Inland Rules, which did not adopt the "vessel constrained by her draft"
rule in the COLREGS, leaving even the conscientious mariner with no visu-
al lights or dayshapes to signal that an approaching vessel can "safely navi-
gate only in that channel."
IV.
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
At least five potential responses to Rule 9 ambiguity and uncertainty pres-
ent themselves. The alternatives include the two extremes: (1) preservation
of the status quo (i.e., doing nothing), and (2) taking steps to repeal Rule 9,
thereby relegating collision prevention in narrow channels and fairways to
the ordinary steering and sailing rules that govern other waters and obviat-
ing any waterway designations. Approaches that steer a more pragmatic and
responsible course include (3) amending the rules to add a narrow channel
definition, (4) formally designating waters where Rule 9 applies, as some
Coast Guard sector commanders have already done, or (5) publishing a list
of prior determinations on waterway status-much as the Coast Guard now
does with "navigable waters of the United States" determinations-that will
be presumptively valid in future cases involving questions regarding appli-
cation of Rule 9 in those waters, together with a guidance document setting
out specific factors to apply in making determinations for waters not yet the
subject of a determination. After identifying the criteria that should be used
in evaluating the alternative approaches, the following section examines the
merits of and potential objections to the alternatives.
"Rule 8(f) was added to the COLREGS in 1989 and to the Inland Rules in 1991. Earlier versions of
the narrow channel rule directed smaller vessels not to "hamper" the safe passage of the channel-bound
vessel. See supra, note 44.
"'See Nautical Institute, Correspondence (by Roger Syms), Seaways, Jan. 2004, at 30.
Recommendations to replace the duty not to impede with a requirement to keep clear assume that the lat-
ter duty will be more easily understood and complied with than the duty not to impede.
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A. Criteria for Selecting Course of Action
This Article accepts the widely held view that the goals of the maritime
risk management regime are to eliminate unnecessary risk, reduce the prob-
ability of, or potential losses posed by, risks that cannot be eliminated and
allocate liability for accidents in a way that requires risk generators to inter-
nalize the cost of the accidents they cause."' A rule that purports to be tai-
lored for collision avoidance in narrow channels or fairways must be respon-
sive to the particular hazards posed by and to those waterways. The rule
must be adapted and phrased in a way that serves its primary purpose of pre-
venting collisions, not merely the secondary purpose of allocating liability
for the collisions not prevented. At the same time, it must not unreasonably
increase non-collision risks, such as groundings or allisions. The Rule 9
approach that best serves those goals is the preferred one. To determine
which approach best serves those goals, alternative rule candidates should
be tested to assess their relative effectiveness."2
The list of desirable and undesirable qualities of rules is potentially limit-
less; however, a few are worth singling out with respect to Rule 9. Collision
prevention rules should be simple (easily comprehended) and clear in their
application (unambiguous). Admittedly, these twin goals at times come into
conflict. For example, to eliminate or reduce ambiguity and the danger of
subjective or conflicting rule interpretations, rule drafters might feel com-
pelled to add definitions and explanatory or qualifying clauses to what was
otherwise a brief and simple rule, thus subordinating brevity to clarity.
However, the increasing use of "plain language" in drafting federal rules and
regulations provides numerous examples where the balance between sim-
plicity and clarity has been struck effectively and prolixity was avoided."'
See supra, note 19 (the goal is to reduce the total cost of accidents and accident prevention). See
also supra, note 36 (not all risks must be tolerated or accommodated).
"The earlier cited MIT studies employed the Bayesian method to assess the effect of various factors
on the risk of vessel groundings or collisions. See supra, note 29 and accompanying text. The study
method should be extended to assess the effect of alternative collision prevention rules (including repeal
of Rule 9 and giving effect to the default steering and sailing rules) to determine which rule set best pre-
vents collisions without unreasonably increasing the risk of other casualties, such as groundings or col-
lisions. For example, the "keep-to-starboard" rule undoubtedly decreases the probability of ambiguous
meeting situations that might lead to conflicting action and collision; however, by requiring the vessel to
navigate well to the right of the channel center it might also increase the probability of grounding, alli-
sion with piers or lateral channel buoys and hydrodynamic interaction.
"'See William J. Clinton, Presidential Memorandum of June 1, 1998-Plain Language in
Government Writing, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,885 (June 1, 1998); Plain Language Action and Information
Network, Plain Language: Improving Communication from the Federal Government to the Public,
http://www.plainlanguage.gov/index.cfm. The 2007 changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
the Style Project authors sought to re-cast the 70 year old rules in order to make them clearer and easier
to learn and apply.
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Collision prevention rules should be drafted in a way that best promotes
voluntary compliance and avoids the need for extensive at-sea enforcement to
ensure the rules' effectiveness. Rules designed to guide action to prevent col-
lisions should also provide predictability for vessel operators and keep the
need for communication between the approaching vessels to a minimum. To
achieve that, the rule must be drafted in terms that will maximize the proba-
bility that they will be interpreted and applied by both operators of the
approaching vessels in the manner intended by the rule drafters. Said another
way, the rule should be written such that the probability of misunderstanding,
misinterpretation or misapplication by either vessel operator is minimized."4
Questions of practicality, feasibility and timing must be considered in
choosing a course of action, particularly for any alternative that would
require an amendment to one or both sets of rules. The COLREGS
Convention makes provision for amendments to the convention's rules;
however, the process and the need to build substantial support for any
amendment require considerable time and effort."' Although the Inland
Rules will soon be subject to amendment by the Coast Guard through ordi-
nary notice and comment rulemaking,"6 practical considerations weigh
against reliance on an alternative that w6uld require resort to the dreadfully
slow Coast Guard formal rulemaking process. It should also be recalled that
Rule 1(b) of the COLREGS requires that any special local rules, such as the
U.S. Inland Rules, must conform as closely as possible to the COLREGS
rule. Additionally, the United States and Canada have acted to promote uni-
formity in the rules applicable on the Great Lakes by, among other things,
adopting conforming versions of Rule 9 for those waters."' Thus, any fur-
".Such errors may be a result of linguistic uncertainty or epistenic uncertainty. The former concerns
uncertainty over the meaning of the rule while the latter refers to uncertainty in its application to the facts
of the particular case. A rule which provides that all channels less than 600 feet wide from bank to bank
are "narrow channels" suffers little or no linguistic uncertainty, but if the mariner has no way of deter-
mining the width of the channel epistemic uncertainty might frustrate application of the rule. A rule that
categorically deems the Willamette River a narrow channel for purposes of Rule 9 avoids both uncer-
tainties. With such a rule, mariners need not waste valuable decision time wondering whether the rule
applies.
"'An amendment to the COLREGS Convention must first be adopted by a two-thirds majority of
those present and voting in the Maritime Safety Committee and then by the same two-thirds majority of
the members of the IMO Assembly. The amendment then enters into force on the date specified by the
Assembly unless more than one-third of the contracting States notify the IMO that they object to the
amendment. See COLREGS Convention, supra, note 5, art. VI.
""The Iland Rules are presently codified in 33 U.S.C. ch. 34; however, in 2004 Congress authorized
the secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard operates to "move" the rules from the U.S.
Code to the Code of Federal Regulations. See Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004,
Title m, § 303, Pub. L. No. 108-293, 118 Stat. 1028, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2001 Note.
"'See Canadian Modified Rule 9(k), Collision Regulations with Canadian Modifications,
Consolidated Regulations of Canada (C.R.C), c. 1416, Schedule 1, available at http://laws.justice.gc.cal
en/ShowFullDoc/cr/CR.C.-c.1416//20090730/en.
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ther change to the text of the Inland Rules without a corresponding change
to the analogous COLREGS rule must be evaluated in light of these inter-
national law and relations issues. Finally, regulators should always be cir-
cumspect in their approach to changes in long-established and widely appli-
cable rules. Although any rule set should provide an orderly procedure for
amendments to adapt to new risks or incorporate better risk management
measures, frequent changes to the rules create confusion and should be
avoided.
B. The Alternatives
Bearing in mind the problems with the existing regime identified above
and the criteria for evaluating the alternative courses of action to remedy
those problems, and convinced that doing nothing would be irresponsible,
this Article now turns to an evaluation of the remaining four alternatives:
repealing Rule 9, amending Rule 9, formally designating waterways where
Rule 9 applies in the United States and publishing a list of prior "narrow
channel" determinations, together with guidance designed to provide ade-
quate basis for making narrow channel determinations for the waters not yet
the subject of a determination."'
Alternative 1: Repeal Rule 9
At first blush, the "repeal Rule 9" alternative might seem too radical for
serious consideration. For three reasons, however, this analysis begins with
such a challenge to the very retention of Rule 9. The first reason is that a
rational, though ultimately unpersuasive, argument can in fact be made for
repeal of the rule, thereby relegating the confined waters collision preven-
tion scheme to the default rules elsewhere in Subparts B.11 and B.11 of the
COLREGS and Inland Rules."' The second and more compelling reason is
"'Not separately considered in this Article is the option of launching a more aggressive Rule 9 edu-
cation and enforcement program. Even the clearest and wisest rule will not be effective if it is not com-
plied with. Rules of the road examinations should emphasize the means for determining where Rule 9
applies. Potential violators should be reminded that proof that a vessel violated one of the Rule 9 prohi-
bitions against impeding the passage of a vessel following a narrow channel may give rise to a pre-
sumption of causative fault under the rule of The Pennsylvania (86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 1998 A.M.C.
1506 (1874)) and may provide grounds for administrative action against a professional mariner's license
or for a civil penalty. 33 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). Some cases may even rise to the level of grossly negli-
gent navigation of a vessel in a manner that endangers life or limb, triggering possible criminal penal-
ties. 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (2006).
"One justification for repealing Rule 9 is that a system with fewer rules generally promotes the goals
of simplicity, clarity and predictability. Counter-arguments might be developed and tested through the
kind of careful study of rule effectiveness advocated in note 112.
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that only by carefully considering the collision prevention scheme without
Rule 9 can the risk analyst appreciate the importance of the rule and the need
to bring greater certainty and consistency to its application. Finally, such a
"Rule 9 justification exercise" alerts the analyst to needed reforms in the
rule.
Any proposal to repeal Rule 9 from the COLREGS or Inland Rules must
carefully consider each of the rule's elements and what they add to, or over-
ride in, the default collision prevention rules. Paragraph 9(a) of the rule car-
ries forward the only duty prescribed by the original narrow channel rule'20
and establishes what many consider the most important obligation under the
modem version of the rule: the "keep-to-starboard" requirement." 2' To be
sure, by taking the vessel off the channel range (if one is installed) and clos-
er to the lateral buoy line, the bank or channel "wall" and piers, the require-
ment to keep to the starboard side of the channel does increase some navi-
gational risks.'22 But skeptics of the keep-to-starboard requirement of the
narrow channel rule would do well to study Captain John Kemp's analysis
of the tragic collision between the Bywell Castle and the Princess Alice on
London's River Thames in 1878.123 The collision occurred during a fifteen
year period when the keep-to-starboard rule was not in force in England.'24
As a result, while the downbound Bywell Castle followed the former rule
and kept to starboard (near the right descending river bank), the upbound
Princess Alice was left apparently free to choose sides and elected to stay to
that side of the channel on her port side (also the right descending side). As
she rounded a bend, she unexpectedly encountered the Bywell Castle, result-
ing in the death of most of the Princess Alice's 700 passengers. Although
'As Griffin explains, early versions of the narrow channel rule "codified" the requirement for ves-
sels to keep to starboard established by the courts as early as 1868. See Griffin, supra note - at 88. In his
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures advocating greater judicial freedom in interpreting statutes, particular-
ly what he considers "obsolete" statutes, Judge Calabresi distinguishes between statutes that codify
judge-made common law and those intended by the legislature to be primary sources of law. Guido
Calabresi,A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 5 (1982). The narrow channel rule, which has its roots
in judicially-adopted customs, falls mainly in the former category.
"'The British Patrol, [1968] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 118 (C.A.) ("I have always held the view, and I express
it once again, that this is a most important rule which calls for strict observance on the part of vessels
navigating in narrow waters").
"A vessel navigating near the bank or channel "walls" is more likely to encounter hydrodynamic
interaction with the adjacent bank. That position also gives the vessel less time and room to maneuver
for crossing traffic, barge fleeting operations and vessels getting underway from piers and wharves. See
supra, note 112.
'"See John Kemp, The COLREGS and the Princess Alice, 61 J. Nay. 271 (2008).
"In 1876, a Joint Committee of the Admiralty, the Board of Trade and Trinity House had recom-
mended that the rule, which had been abolished in 1863, be reinstated. However, no action had been
taken by 1878. Id. at 275.
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Captain Kemp has criticized other aspects of the COLREGS, he concludes
in his analysis of this incident that Rules 9 and 10, which reduce the proba-
bility of vessels meeting end-on, are of "great importance," because they
provide the physical separation necessary to avoid risk of collision.'25
Whether a Rule 2 based "good seamanship" requirement to keep to star-
board (applied by some courts in non-narrow channels) would provide sim-
ilar predictability in the absence of a positive Rule 9(a) requirement is
doubtful. Therefore, broader and more certain application of Rule 9(a)
should be promoted.
Alternative 2: Amend Rule 9
Rule 9 is too important to repeal and too uncertain in its application to
leave as is. The uncertainty could be addressed by amending the rule to add
a clear and workable definition of "narrow channel or fairway" or by mak-
ing the rule applicable only in waters designated as a narrow channel or fair-
way by an appropriate authority (thereby requiring the further actions set out
in the next section of this Article). 26 The two approaches could also be com-
bined. The combined approach would align Rule 9 with Rule 10 for TSSs
and other Ships' Routing Systems, which rely on a brief definition, a desig-
nation approval process and public notice of the designation along with the
nature of the measures applicable in the designated area. One drawback to
an approach that requires prior designation is that Rule 9 would not apply in
waterways that are obviously narrow channels but which have not yet been
formally designated, whether through neglect, oversight or lack of
resources. Amending the Rule to add a definition or to require prior desig-
nation also raises the rule amendment issues described in the previous sec-
tion. Additionally, even proposals for minor amendments to the rules of the
road raises the question of broader rule reform.
Proposals for reform of the collision prevention rules have spanned the
spectrum from modest suggestions for clarifications and updates, to adapt to
or incorporate new technologies, to calls for sweeping changes that chal-
lenge the very foundational precepts underlying the rules.'27 Others simply
"'Id. at 279-80. Predictable spatial separation is negated where customs like the point-bend custom
followed in some sections at some times on the Mississippi River, override the keep-to-starboard rule.
"'A "narrow channel" definition developed by those with expertise in collision prevention would
likely avoid the indeterminacy of the current multi-factor approach adopted by some courts that takes
into account a variety of ephemeral circumstances and leads to the untenable situation in which a water-
way is "narrow for me, but not for you," or "narrow yesterday, but not today." Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Glenn,_ U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing other justices
for their "fondness for a judge-liberating totality-of-the-circumstances 'test."').
"'David Thomas, The Fatal Flaw: Collision at Sea and the Failure of the Rules (2001).
Vol. 41, No. 1
Narrow Channel Collision Prevention
envision a diminished role for the collision prevention rules in the coming
years. For example, some maritime risk analysts prophesy a coming shift to
autonomous "software solutions" to collision avoidance that will augment or
even supplant the human watchstander with computerized risk detection,
analysis and decision making.128 Those solutions might then be negotiated
and implemented through digital ship-to-ship AIS exchanges in which one
ship's computer proposes and the other's accepts a computer-selected colli-
sion avoidance solution, and then each communicates the agreed-upon solu-
tion to the vessel's voyage planning program for implementation. A flashing
indicator light might notify the watch officer that a "collision avoidance
adjustment" to the voyage plan is being executed. Still another group of
reformers would replace vessel-based planning and decision making with
shoreside vessel control (which will also increasingly be automated), under
the belief that error is less of a problem ashore than afloat. Whether such
sweeping changes to risk management in restricted waters are practicable or
likely is at present doubtful, and in any event they are too remote to address
the immediate problems identified above.
a. Adding a Definition of "Narrow Channel or Fairway"
Assuming that, at least for the immediate future, collision prevention deci-
sions will continue to be made by mariners, the rule set provided to those
mariners for restricted waters operations can take several forms. Those forms
generally fall somewhere in the continuum between clearly applicable rules
that provide only one option and flexible standards that give wide discretion
to the involved mariners to exercise their judgment on how best to avoid col-
lision.129 The former, "mechanical" rules provide the greatest predictability,
but at the cost of flexibility. A requirement to sound a one second signal on
the ship's whistle before turning to starboard (Rule 34(a)) is a rule. A twelve-
factor test for use by radar-equipped vessels to assess "safe speed" (Rule 6)
is a standard. Although at very different positions on the "rule continuum,"
these two rule examples share one thing in common: both are clear in when
and where they apply. That distinguishes them from Rule 9.
"Cf. Thomas Statheros, et al., Autonomous Ship Collision Avoidance Navigation Concepts,
Technologies and Techniques, 61 J. Nay. 129, 137 (2008) (observing that, in preventing collisions, some
such programs violate the COLREGS). The authors argue that the rules of the road have been laid down
to minimize the subjective nature of humans; however, even if the rules were fully defined, human
intepretation of them is still subjective since ship navigation maneuvers are performed in real-time and
sometimes under demanding exogenous inputs. Id. at 130. "The subjective nature of humans can only be
removed from ship navigation when humans are no longer responsible for ship navigation." Id.
'"See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 555-56 (6th ed. 2003) (distinguishing between
the construction and application of narrow, precise "rules" and broad, vague "standards").
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One or both rule sets could certainly be amended to add a definition of
"narrow channels or fairways."'" The Coast Guard's one-time objection that
it would be "virtually impossible"'"' to provide a general application defini-
tion of the term likely exaggerates the difficulty.'32 Moreover, if that were
true neither the agency nor the courts should expect mariners to step into the
breach. But merely adding a "narrow channel" definition would not effec-
tively solve the problem identified above. Any definition would still have to
be applied by mariners on a case-by-case basis, when time, space and speed
call for prompt and accurate decisions. The frequency and dangers of con-
flicting application of the new definition by two approaching vessels and the
danger of delayed avoidance action might be diminished, but would not be
eliminated by the new definition.
b. Amending Rule 9 so it Applies only to Designated Waterways
Amending Rule 9 so it applies only to designated waterways would align
Rule 9 with the other area-based rules familiar to mariners, such as Rule 10
applicable to TSSs. However, in addition to the problems inherent in any
amendment to the rules, this approach would not be effective until the desig-
nating authority completed the designation process. The new rule would effec-
tively repeal the narrow channel rule until the designations were completed.
Section lf.B.3 more fully analyzes the arguments for and against prior desig-
nation of waterways as narrow channels and will not be repeated here. It
should be noted, however, that the prior designation approach described in
Alternative 3 below does not require that Rule 9 be amended so it applies only
in previously designated waters. The designations described in Alternative 3
would supplement existing Rule 9 through a non-exhaustive list of waterways
where Rule 9 has been deemed to apply. A waterway's omission from the list
would not necessarily mean that Rule 9 does not also apply to it.
c. Finishing the Task: Other Rule 9 Amendments
If Rule 9 is amended to either add a definition of narrow channel or fair-
way or to condition its application prior to designation of the waterway, the
drafters might take advantage of the opportunity to address several other
defects in the present rule.'33 The case for replacing the current Rule 9 duty
'For examples of other area-based risk prevention schemes which demonstrate the feasibility of
establishing workable definitions see 33 C.F.R. § 167.5.
"'See supra, note 11 and accompanying text.
'"The Nautical Institute, Royal Institute of Navigation or U.S. Maritime Law Association might be
appropriate and willing forums to develop or vet a definition for narrow channels and fairways.
"A Rule 9 shorn of paragraphs 9(e) and 9(f) would certainly appeal to simplicity proponents, and
would avoid the confusing suggestion that such maneuvering signals are sounded in restricted visibility
(as their placement in the all-weather Rule 9 would suggest). See supra, note 51.
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"not to impede" in paragraphs 9(b), 9(c) and 9(d) with a duty to "keep out
the way" has been made by a number of experts.'" Additionally, incorporat-
ing the "vessel constrained by her draft" rules into the Inland Rules would
reduce some of the uncertainty in application of Inland Rule paragraphs 9(b)
and 9(d). In drafting the Inland Navigation Rules Act of 1980, Congress
rejected this part of the COLREGS for reasons that are not very persuasive.
Congress explained:
The 72 Colregs Rule 18(d) directs vessels to avoid impeding a vessel "con-
strained by her draft" but does not assign a right-of-way to the constrained
vessel. Such a subjective rule might lead to abuses and result in a situation
wherein a vessel considering herself constrained by her draft claims a right-
of-way to which she is not entitled, thereby creating a dangerous situation.'35
Experience has shown, however, that the same "subjective" determinations
are made every day by vessels restricted in their ability to maneuver and not
under command, without widespread outcries that the claim to status is
being abused. On the other hand, two considerations argue in favor of incor-
porating the constrained-by-draft recognition. Without such recognition, the
circumstances under which Rules 9(b) and 9(d) apply are much less pre-
dictable, undermining the effectiveness of this priority for channel-bound
vessels. The omission also leaves the United States out of step with the
COLREGS for reasons that do not appear to meet the strict standards for dis-
crepant "local rules" set out by Rule 1(b) of the COLREGS.
Predictability is the key to the keep-to-starboard rule's effectiveness. In a
case decided before the 1972 COLREGS entered into force, the British courts
emphasized that it was essential that the "keep-to-starboard rule" be applied
uniformly to all ships navigating up and down the river, irrespective of their
draft and the state of the tide.'16 In the United States, however, the pre-
dictability provided by the keep-to-starboard requirement in Rule 9 is under-
mined in some waterways by two common "exceptions." First, in the lower
Mississippi River, the point-bend custom recognizes the practice of vessels
upbound against the river current taking the "points" in the river (as the
Princess Alice attempted to do on the River Thames), while the downbound
vessel takes the "bends."' Under the second exception, found only in the
Inland Rules, Rule 9(a)(ii) gives downbound power-driven vessels in narrow
"This amendment would more closely align Rule 9 with Inland Rule 15(b), which uses the "keep out
of the way" language. See supra note [49]. It would also be consistent with Congressional intent that
Inland Rule 9(d) establishes a "stay-clear commandant." See supra, note 50.
"S. Rep. No. 96-979, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. & News at 7081.
"The Koningin Juliana, [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 308 (Adm.), [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 353 (CA.), [1975]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 111 (H.L.).
1
7Robert T. Lemon, The Mississippi River 'Point-Bend' Custom, 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 373 (1988).
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channels or fairways on the Great Lakes,"' Western Rivers or waters desig-
nated by the secretary'" the right of way, and allows the downbound vessel
to propose the manner and place of passage. As a result, the downbound ves-
sel might well not keep to the starboard side of the channel. Despite the dam-
age these "exceptions" do to predictability, reformers must be mindful that
one exception is entrenched in custom and the other codified in the Inland
Rules, and any attempt to alter either would certainly be resisted.
Alternative 3: Formally Designate Waters Where Rule 9 Applies.
Even without a formal amendment to the rules, the Coast Guard could
eliminate much of the present Rule 9 uncertainty through the exercise of its
delegated rulemaking authority, to formally designate those waters and
waterways the agency deems to be "narrow channels or fairways" for pur-
poses of Rule 9. That was, in fact, the agency's initial reaction to the 1982
NTSB recommendation.14 An "interpretive ruling" drafted but never prom-
ulgated by the Coast Guard would have provided that "For the purposes of
application of Rule 9(a)(ii) as it applies on the Western Rivers: The Western
Rivers are defined to constitute a narrow channel and, as such, Rule 9(a)(ii)
shall be applied where the passing situation described occurs anywhere on
the Western Rivers." 4' The Coast Guard again raised the issue of formal des-
ignation with NAVSAC in 2009.
One Coast Guard commentator, writing in 1983, examined the formal
designation approach in conjunction with two others.14 2 The three alterna-
tives he identified to resolve the narrow channel definition problem includ-
ed: provide "guidance" by publishing a summary of the factors the courts
have considered and then continue to leave actual determinations up to the
mariners;'43 designate certain portions or reaches of waterways as narrow
"'Canada has adopted a similar rule. See supra, note 117.
"'Those waters include the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, Tombigbee River, Black Warrior River,
Alabama River, Coosa River, Mobile River above Cochrane Bridge at St. Louis Point, Flint River,
Chattahoochee River, and Apalachicola River above its confluence with the Jackson River. See 33 C.F.R.
§ 89.25 (2008).
"See supra, note 11.
"'U.S. Coast Guard, Draft Interpretive Ruling for Application of Rule 9(a)(ii) (undated) (copy on file
with the author). The cases setting out the legal test for determining whether a waterway is a narrow
channel have treated that test as trans-substantive. That is, the legal test does not vary in its application
from one component paragraph of Rule 9 to another, as it might under a dipeage approach. Thus, a
waterway that qualifies as a narrow channel for purposes of applying the keep-to-starboard requirement
would also be a narrow channel for purposes of applying the vessel priorities.
"'William B. Thomas, How Narrow is a Narrow Channel? 14 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 537 (1983).
"'Commander Thomas was skeptical that this approach would help, given that even after a collision
the experts, who have months to examine the issue, are often unable to agree on whether the waters con-
stituted a narrow channel or fairway. Id. at 555. That disagreement may simply be a product of our adver-
sarial "expert" system.
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channels and indicate their status on charts;'" or designate an entire water-
way system as a narrow channel.'45 The first approach will be taken up in
section mI.B.3 of this Article. The second and third approaches are consid-
ered together in this section. By relying on formal designation, those latter
two approaches would more closely align the rule for narrow channels and
fairways with Rule 10 for TSSs. The distinction between the latter two
approaches he identified highlights the fact Rule 9 designations must recog-
nize that a waterway might be "narrow" in some segments or reaches, but is
not necessarily narrow throughout its range. For example, in an early case
arising on the Columbia River (which flows over 1,200 miles from its
Canadian headwaters and through Washington and Oregon on its way to the
Pacific Ocean), the federal district court held only that specified reaches of
the river fall within the narrow channel rule.'" On the other hand, the
Willamette River, which flows into the Columbia near Portland, Oregon,
was held by another court to be a narrow channel without qualification as to
any particular river mile or section.'47
a. Objections to Narrow Channel Designations
Possible objections to a proposal to formally designate waters or water-
ways as "narrow channels or fairways" for purposes of applying Rule 9
include insufficient justification, lack of authority or legitimacy, impracti-
cality and lack of resources to carry out the task. Those who argue against
designation point out that the United States has some 25,000 miles of com-
mercially navigable channels, rendering the task of measuring, assessing
and designating those that fall under the narrow channel rule impossibly dif-
ficult. Moreover, if regulatory authorities designate any waterways as nar-
row channels and fairways, they must designate all of them, or mariners will
be misled into believing that those waterways not so designated do not fall
within the rule.
"This second alternative has the advantage of being closely tailored to actual waterway conditions,
but would require mariners transiting long waterways to be constantly mindful of which segments were
narrow channels and which were not. Id.
"'The third alternative has the advantage of certainty, simplicity and predictability. However, it would
conflict with the point-bend custom where and when the custom applies. Id. at 556-59.
"The Cascades, 178 F. 726, 731 (D. Or. 1910) (holding that "[t]he Columbia river in the vicinity of
the place where the collision occurred must be held to be a narrow channel, which is subject to the regu-
lation of article 25 of the Inland Navigation Rules, requiring steam vessels, when safe and practicable, to
keep to the side of the fairway which lies on the starboard side.") (emphasis added and citations omitted).
"'American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. (The Pennsylvanian) v. Western Transp. Co., 139 F.2d 478, 480-81,
1943 A.M.C. 1330 (9th Cir. 1943) ("the Willamette River channel must be regarded as a narrow one" and
adding that "[t]he evidence establishes that it was a common practice for river boats to use the eastern
side of the river. However, proof of custom or convenience alone will not justify an infringement of the
narrow channel rule").
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There is no easy answer to the resource constraint question. At the same
time, much of the background work necessary for the designations has already
been completed by the courts and agencies. In response to the "insufficient
justification" objection, a strong "justification" case can be made that pub-
lished designations would provide much needed clarity and predictability in
the rule's application; thereby reducing collision risks, and would be unlikely
to increase any aspect of that risk. As to the possible authority and legitimacy
objections, the following section will demonstrate that the Coast Guard has
ample authority for making such designations, particularly in Inland Rule
waters. Opponents might also be asked why it would be more legitimate or
effective in their mind to leave it to hundreds of individual mariners to make
the decision on the rule's application rather than the government agencies and
MTS stakeholders.' The last objection, that if any waters are designated all
qualifying waters must be designated, to avoid confusion, is easily disposed
of. The argument loosely rests on the canon of statutory construction expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing impliedly
excludes all others). The canon does not apply, however, where the enumera-
tion or list is expressly qualified as non-exclusive or non-exhaustive."4
Despite the objections, the case for pre-designating narrow channels or
fairways is quite strong. The paramount purpose of Rule 9 is the regulation
of primary conduct by mariners, not secondary liability determinations. s0
The effectiveness of Rule 9 as a collision prevention measure depends far
more on voluntary compliance than on deterrence, enforcement or collision
liability litigation. In the absence of reliable and accessible advance notice
of where the rule applies, even the most compliance minded mariner may
reach the wrong conclusion or at the very least suffer unnecessary delays in
taking collision avoidance action while processing and analyzing the infor-
mation relevant to the waterway's status.
b. The Authority to Designate Waters as Narrow Channels
Any formal designation of waters as "narrow channels or fairways" must
be grounded in legal authority for such designations. Looking first at the
"'It will be recalled that in the United Kingdom, admiralty courts may receive advice from the nau-
tical assessors on whether a waterway is a narrow channel or fairway. See supra, note 59. In the United
States, courts may consider expert testimony on the question. Id.
"'Mindful of the need for qualification, the Captain of the Port for San Francisco designated a num-
ber of "narrow channels or fairways", while cautioning that "this list is not all-inclusive." See infra, note
164 and accompanying text. Similarly, the Corps' regulations listing "navigable waters of the United
States" address the expressio unius issue by warning that: "It should be noted that the lists represent only
those waterbodies for which determinations have been made; absence from that list should not be taken
as an indication that the waterbody is not navigable. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.16(b) (2008).
"See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111, 2000 A.M.C. 913 (2000) (distinguishing laws
regulating a vessel's "primary conduct" from those involving liability).
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COLREGS, it is true that nothing in the COLREGS Convention expressly
gives States-Parties authority to prescribe "narrow channels or fairways"
where Rule 9 applies. On the other hand, neither do the COLREGS require
IMO approval before Rule 9 applies, as the convention does for Rule 10
applicable to TSSs, ' suggesting that States have greater latitude to deter-
mine where Rule 9 will apply. States have, in fact, long designated waters
where the COLREGS Rule 9 applies. In the United Kingdom, for example,
designations have been made for the tidal waters of the River Thames'52 and
the Port of Tyne.'" Moreover, the practice of pre-designating waters where
a particular collision avoidance rule applies is certainly not an aberration.
That is, in fact, how Rule 10 is structured. That rule applies only to desig-
nated TSSs, giving the mariner clear direction on when and where the rule
applies.
Within the United States, the Coast Guard has authority to make such des-
ignations in both COLREGS and Inland Rules waters. The International
Navigational Rules Act of 1977 provides the secretary of the department in
which the Coast Guard is operating authority to "[p]romulgate such reason-
able rules and regulations as are necessary to implement the provisions of
this Act and the International Regulations proclaimed hereunder." 54
Similarly, the Inland Navigation Rules Act of 1980 authorized the secretary
to "[i]ssue regulations necessary to implement and interpret this act."' 5
Whether denominated as "implementing" regulations or "interpretive" reg-
ulations,"6 the Coast Guard's authority to designate narrow channels or fair-
ways for purposes of applying Rule 9 seems beyond ultra vires challenge.
The Coast Guard's authority to make such designations under the Inland
Rules was made even clearer by the 2004 Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act, which authorized the Coast Guard to make future
amendments to the Inland Rules by notice and comment rulemaking.*
"COLREGS Rule 10 applies to "traffic separation schemes adopted by the [International Maritime]
Organization." COLREGS, supra, note 5, Rule 10(a). The contrast between Rule 10 and Rule 9 suggests
greater latitude has been given to States in their application of Rule 9.
"Port of London Authority, River Byelaws, Section I, available at http://www.thames-rrc.org/
fileadmin/documentsffideway_code/codepg28_topg37.pdf.
"'The Port of Tyne defines the dredged channel (as shown on Admiralty Chart number 1934) as a
"narrow channel or fairway." See Port of Tyne Authority, International Collision Regulations, note fol-
lowing Rule 9, available at http://www.portoftyne.co.uk/sitepage.aspx?id=137.
"-33 U.S.C. § 1607 (2006); 33 CFR. pt. 82 (2009).
"33 U.S.C. § 2071 (2006); 33 CF.R. pts. 89-90 (2009).
"A rule designating certain waters as a "narrow channel or fairway" would be an "implementing"
rule. A rule providing a definition of "narrow channel or fairway" or criteria for making such determi-
nations would be an "interpretive" rule.
"'See supra, note 116.
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It seems unlikely that Congress would be surprised by a move to desig-
nate narrow channels or fairways. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act
(PWSA), as amended, authorized the agency to designate port access routes,
fairways and traffic separation schemes.' In doing so, Congress expressly
directed the agency to issue reasonable regulations governing the use of
such areas, "including the applicability of Rules 9 and 10" of the COLREGS
relating to narrow channels and traffic separation schemes.' In addition, the
PWSA provides the agency with broad authority to control vessel traffic in
hazardous areas or under conditions of vessel congestion or other hazardous
circumstances." The statute expressly includes the authority to establish
vessel traffic routing schemes. There is no reason why, in the exercise of that
authority, the secretary (through the Coast Guard) could not choose to incor-
porate Rule 9 by reference into those traffic regulations.''
Non-judicial waterway status determinations are nothing new in the
United States. The U.S. Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers have
been making and publishing "navigability" determinations for decades.'62
The agencies' jurisdiction often turns on whether a given body of water
meets the relevant test for "navigable waters of the United States." Like the
test historically applied to determine whether a waterway constitutes a nar-
row channel under Rule 9, the tests for determining whether a water body
falls within the definition of navigable waters of the United States reflects
its mixed law and fact nature, the answer to which turns on the waterway's
physical characteristics and its use.'63
Formal Rule 9 applicability determinations have in fact been in place
without serious objection or challenge for more than a quarter of a century.
Coast Guard captains of the port or sector commanders have made and pub-
lished those determinations since at least 1982. For the San Francisco Bay
3533 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1) (2006).
5933 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(5)(A) (2006).
6-33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(4) (2006).
'
6
1Used in this way, Rule 9 might be seen as a "borrowed" rule set, applicable because it has been
incorporated by reference into the regulation, even if not applicable ex proprio vigore.
633 C.F.R. §§ 2.40, 329.16 (2008).
'
6 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563, 2000 A.M.C. 2106 (1870) (setting out the "nav-
igability in fact" test); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171-72, 2000 A.M.C. 2495 (1979)
(highlighting that the test for navigability varies according to its application; the test for navigability for
federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction differs from the test for determining application of the navigation
servitude). Within the "navigable waters of the United States" the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA) pro-
hibits the obstruction of "navigable channels." 33 U.S.C. § 409 (2006). Under the RHA, the phrase "nav-
igable channel" is not limited to those deeper channels marked by buoys and used by larger vessels but
includes any part of a river containing navigable waters, including an anchorage area. See Chute v.
United States, 610 F2d 7, 1980 A.M.C. 941 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). Moreover,
a "fairway" constitutes part of navigable channel, and, as such, it is to be kept open and unobstructed.
See Gaspar v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 656, 1979 A.M.C. 2232 (D. Mass. 1978).
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area, for example, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port issued the following
guidance dating back to a 1982 advisory notice:
The Captain of the Port considers the following areas to be "narrow channels
or fairways" for the purpose of enforcing the International and Inland Rules
of the Road. This list is not all-inclusive, but identifies areas where deep draft
commercial and public vessels routinely operate.'"
c. The Process to be Followed in Designations
If the narrow channel "designation" alternative is selected, the actual task
of designation could be approached in at least two ways. First, the office of
the Coast Guard Commandant charged with waterways management could
invoke the agency's delegated rulemaking authority to promulgate regula-
tions "implementing" the COLREGS and Inland Rules narrow channel pro-
visions by declaring some or all of the waters within the United States that
constitute narrow channels or fairways for purposes of Rule 9.6 Any desig-
nation of water bodies as "narrow channels or fairways" must be made in
compliance with any legislatively required processes. For example, in the
PWSA Congress has prescribed criteria the secretary must consider, the
process that must be followed and to some extent the advisors or stakehold-
ers who must be consulted.'" Regulations designating waterways would
constitute a "rule" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), requir-
ing the agency to comply with the rulemaking procedures described by the
APA and related statutes.'67
The second procedural approach would be for the Commandant to dele-
gate the authority to designate waterways to Coast Guard district or sector
commanders, much like the process used in designating "regulated naviga-
"U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port San Francisco,Advisory 05-095, May 1995, available at U.S.
Coast Guard, Vessel Traffic Services San Francisco User's Manual, http://www.uscgamill dll/vtssf/vtss-
fum.asp. See also 33 C.F.R. § 165.1181(c), (d)(3) (2009) (Regulated Navigation Area in San Francisco
Bay where operators must comply with Rule 9).
"Congress authorized the secretary to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations as are necessary
to implement the COLREGs in 33 U.S.C. § 1607 and to issue regulations necessary to implement and
interpret the Inland Rules under 33 U.S.C. § 2071. In addition, the PWSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(5)(A)-
part of the Coast Guard's authority to designate port access routes, fairways and traffic separation
schemes-requires the secretary to issue reasonable rules and regulations governing the use of such
areas, including the applicability of COLREGS Rules 9 and 10 relating to narrow channels and TSSs.
"33 U.S.C. §§ 1224, 1231 (2006).
'The Administrative Procedures Act defines a "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy..." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006). "Rulemaking" is defined as the "agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006). The APA's rulemaking requirements are codi-
fied in 5 U.S.C. § 553.
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tion areas."'" Determinations would then be made regionally or locally and
in consultation with representatives of the USACE and NOAA, state gov-
ernments, the relevant harbor safety committee, pilots' associations and
VTS personnel. To ensure consistency in the designations among the dis-
tricts or sectors, the Commandant would presumably issue a directive set-
ting forth the criteria to be applied and the process to be followed in making
narrow channel determinations.
d. The Criteria to be Followed in Designations
The narrow channel designation alternative would require development of
criteria for designation as a narrow channel or fairway.'9 The starting point
for the criteria is the rules themselves. For most restricted waterways in the
United States, the applicable rule will be Rule 9 of the Inland Rules.
However, the waters of the Puget Sound region in Washington'o and all of
the navigable waters of Alaska.'. fall under the COLREGS. Because the
COLREGS Convention is a treaty, interpretation of its terms is governed by
the relevant articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).172 In the absence of a definition within the convention, the VCLT
would require that any interpretation of Rule 9 be in accordance with the
"ordinary meaning" of the terms "narrow channel or fairway" in their con-
text and in the light of the COLREGS Convention's object and purpose.'
The object and purpose of the COLREGS is plainly to prevent collisions.
Accordingly, any interpretation of the narrow channel rule should serve that
purpose. More specifically, the purpose of Rule 9 is to address the unique
risks posed by navigation in narrow channels or fairways, thus the need to
mitigate those risks must weigh heavily in any construction of the phrase
narrow channel or fairway. Rule 2 of the COLREGS (and Inland Rules) pro-
"33 C.F.R. § 1.01-30 (2009). Authority to promulgate regulations implementing RNAs has been del-
egated to the district commanders. 33 U.S.C. § 1.05-l(e)(1)(iv) (2009).
"The IMO structure and process for drafting and implementing Ships' Routing Systems could serve
as a useful model. Such an approach would include a brief definition of 'narrow channel" and "narrow
fairway," accompanied by criteria for the rule's application, a process for evaluation and approval, pub-
lication of the designation and education and enforcement measures.
"The COLREGS apply to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Haro Strait, the Strait of Georgia, Puget Sound,
Lake Washington, Lake Union and Hood Canal. See 33 C.F.R. 80.1385 - .1395 (2009).
"'33 U.S.C. § 80.1705 (2009).
"Treaty interpretation is governed by Articles 31-32 of the Convention. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. Although the United States is not a party to the VCLT, most of its provisions are binding as cus-
tomary international law. See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 145
(1987).
"'VCLT, supra, note 172, art. 31(1). The VCLT standard arguably mixes the interpretive approaches
of textualism and purposivism.
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vides additional guidance on construing the rules. Rule 2(b) acknowledges
that dangers of both navigation and collision must be considered in constru-
ing and complying with the rules. Thus, in "construing" Rule 9, and apply-
ing it to a given waterway, due consideration must be given not only to the
danger of collision, but also navigational risks such as allision and ground-
ing.17 4
Inland Rule 9 is, at present, a statute. Accordingly, its construction and
application are governed by well established principles of statutory con-
struction. They require consideration of the text itself, the context in which
that text occurs and the legislative purpose. Unfortunately, those sources
will be of little use in interpreting Rule 9. U.S. courts have long recognized
that neither the 1980 Inland Rules Act nor its predecessors defined the
phrase "narrow channel or fairway.""'1 The legislative history of the Inland
Rules Act of 1980 is similarly silent on the question."' As a result, the usual
starting point is not the text of Rule 9 but rather the narrow channel cases.
In considering the effect of those cases, it should be borne in mind that fed-
eral courts accord a more stringent stare decisis effect to their prior statuto-
ry interpretation cases than to their constitutional interpretation cases."' It
also bears repeating that, because the United States is a party to the COL-
REGS Convention, COLREGS Rule 1(b) must be considered in any inter-
pretation of the Inland Rules. The COLREGS Convention recognizes that
"special rules" may be adopted by some States for certain waterways, but
admonishes that such rules shall conform as closely as possible to the COL-
REGS.
Rule 9 definition and application problems are complicated by the fact
that neither the COLREGS nor the Inland Rules distinguishes between nar-
row "channels" and narrow "fairways." It is doubtful there was ever an
international meeting of the minds on the meaning of either term. Some
States use the terms as rough synonyms."' In England, the courts distinguish
"'An issue that bears further study is the relationship between Rule 2(a) and 2(b) duties with regard
to "special circumstances" and Rule 9 duties applicable in narrow channels or fairways. Arguably, the
fact that Rule 9 specifically addresses collision prevention duties in waters constituting a narrow chan-
nel or fairway, the factors that determine the waterway's status as a narrow channel would not constitute
"special circumstances" under Rule 2. By contrast, a channel not qualifying as a narrow channel under
Rule 9 might present dangers that would constitute "special circumstances" requiring additional precau-
tions under Rule 2(a) or even a departure from the rules, under Rule 2(b).
"'Canal Barge Co., Inc. v. China Ocean Shipping Co., 770 F.2d 1357, 1362, 1986 A.M.C. 2042 (5th
Cir. 1985).
"'See supra, note 8.
"14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, _ U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1478 (2009).
"See, e.g., Transport Canada, Standard Marine Navigational Vocabulary, Transport Pub. 4330 E, Part
I, Glossary (offering no definition for "channel," but defining "fairway" as the "navigable part of a
waterway"), available at http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafetyffP/tp4330/part-ii.htm.
41January 2010
42 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce
the two terms, sometimes finding designated "fairways" within "narrow
channels." Referring to the earlier version of the narrow channel rule, the
English Court of Appeal (Sir Gordon Willmer, J.) explained:
I think it is wrong .. . to treat the word 'fairway' as synonymous with 'chan-
nel.' Effect should be given to the fact that those responsible for drafting the
rule saw fit to use two separate words. It seems to me that they must have had
in mind that within any 'narrow channel' there may well be a defined 'fair-
way.' If there is a 'fairway' within the narrow channel, the requirement is that
a vessel must keep to that side of such 'fairway' which lies on her starboard
side. In the relatively rare case of a channel that does not include a defined
fairway, the requirement is to keep to starboard of the middle of the channel
as a whole.'
The fact that some States-Parties to the COLREGS Convention use both
terms and ascribe different meanings to the terms "channel" and "fairway"
does not mean all States do; nor does it mean that those States that do use
both terms assign the same meaning to those terms as do other States.
Perhaps the most helpful distinction that can be made within the United
States is that "fairways" are most often a creature of regulation, and such
regulatory designations are made by Coast Guard district commanders.
Admittedly, that distinction is of no more help to the mariner faced with a
Rule 9 applicability question than the circular explanation that "fairways are
where fairway buoys are found." If the Coast Guard concludes that it would
be helpful to separately designate narrow channels and narrow fairways
where Rule 9 will apply, the designation regulations should include working
definitions of each term and then apply those definitions as appropriate to
the designated waterways. Alternatively, the distinction could be side-
stepped by simply designating the qualifying waterway as a "narrow chan-
nel or fairway for purposes of Rule 9," as did the Captain of the Port for San
Francisco."'
Rule 9 is written for mariners. Accordingly, the rule should be interpret-
ed according to the understandings of the mariner.' The criteria for deter-
mining which waterways are a "narrow channel or fairway" should be divid-
ed between the waterway's physical characteristics and its usage. Various
other factors sometimes described by some courts as "surrounding circum-
stances" will in most cases fit into one of these categories. In contrast to the
"'he Koningin Juliana, [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 353, 362 (C.A.).
"See supra, note 164.
"See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 536
(1947) ("If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not to assume that Congress intend-
ed its words to be read with the minds of ordinary men. If they are addressed to specialists, they must be
read by judges with the minds of the specialists.").
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approach used by a few courts and even by the Coast Guard in a notable
license suspension action,' the Rule 9 test should focus on the general use
of the waterways over time, not on the particular vessels involved. The
phrase "narrow channel or fairway" describes a waterway, not the vessels
involved in a collision. The predictability that comes from consistent appli-
cation of the rule can be achieved only by focusing on the waterway itself.
Such a rule could, at times, prove over-inclusive, but the safety gains from
a predictable rule-particularly one that directs vessels to keep-to-starboard,
thereby minimizing the probability of dangerously ambiguous meeting situ-
ations-outweigh the occasional inclusiveness error.'
The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence on admiralty and maritime sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over tort claims may provide useful guidance for
those tasked with drafting the narrow channel designation criteria. Until
1972, the Court applied a relatively straightforward "locality" test for tort
jurisdiction established by the Court more than a century earlier in The
Plymouth.'" In 1972, the Court announced a new "locality-plus-nexus" test
in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.'5 The subsequent
"nexus" cases have confounded many and satisfied few, but they provide
two important lessons on "purpose-based" rules for Rule 9 analysts. Writing
for the Court in Sisson v. Ruby, Justice Marshall explained that maritime
nexus is a two-part test that turns on whether the tort has the potential to dis-
rupt maritime commerce and whether the activity giving rise to the incident
bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity."' Justice
Souter later tried to clarify the Court's nexus test in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.
v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co.'" In explaining the "substantial rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activity" prong, he explained that "[w]e ask
whether a tortfeasor's activity, commercial or noncommercial, on navigable
waters, is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law
that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules would apply in the case
at hand."'" Definitions for "narrow channels or fairways" or criteria for
'"See supra, note 59 (U.S. Coast Guard, Decision on Appeal No. 2519 (1991)).
m'Whether those same safety gains warrant a fresh look at the point-bend custom will be left to oth-
ers to debate.
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36, 1999 A.M.C. 2403 (1866) ("[e]very species of tort, however occurring,
and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty jurisdic-
tion.").
'409 U.S. 249,268, 1973 A.M.C. 1 (1972). See also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668,
673, 1982 A.M.C. 2253 (1982) (extending Executive Jet-an aviation case-to a collision between two
pleasure boats).
"497 U.S. 358, 364-65, 1990 A.M.C. 1801 (1990).
"513 U.S. 527, 1995 A.M.C. 913 (1995).
"Id. at 539-40 (emphasis added).
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determining which waterways fall within that class of waters should simi-
larly be grounded in the purposes behind Rule 9.'"1
The Supreme Court's approach to the second "potential to disrupt mar-
itime commerce" prong is similarly purpose-based, and it too provides a les-
son for those construing Rule 9. In Sisson v. Ruby, Justice Marshall
explained that "[w]e determine the potential impact of a given type of inci-
dent by examining its general character. The jurisdictional inquiry does not
turn on the actual effects on maritime commerce . . . nor does it turn on the
particular facts of the incident in this case . .. ."" Narrow channel determi-
nations should similarly avoid focusing narrowly on the particular vessels
involved or the conditions of the day. To achieve its purpose, Rule 9 must be
applied to those waters where the physical characteristics of the waterway
and its usage over time call for the specialized collision preventions meas-
ures set out in the rule. Just as a narrow focus on the "particulars" of a given
incident rather than its "general character" would frustrate the admiralty
jurisdiction purpose in protecting against disruption of maritime commerce,
too narrow a focus on the particular vessels involved in an incident will frus-
trate the collision prevention purpose of Rule 9.
e. The Use of Prior Judicial Determinations
Whether designations are made by the Commandant or by district or sec-
tor commanders, prior court determinations affirmatively finding that a
waterway is a narrow channel or fairway will likely be given great weight.
Those prior judicial decisions can be used in two ways. The first use, which
no one seriously disputes is valid, is to extract the criteria and methodology
used by the courts in reaching those prior decisions, to serve as guides for
agencies and mariners in making future determinations. The second use-as
a precedent or presumptive precedent-is sometimes contested. Because a
channel's status vel non as a narrow channel or fairway is a mixed question
of law and fact, the courts' prior decisions are not legally binding in future
cases where the relevant facts are materially different.
In approaching prior judicial determinations it may be helpful to recall the
distinction between the precedential effect of a prior judgment on a purely
legal question under the principle of stare decisis and the binding effect of a
prior judgment on a mixed question of fact and law under the principle of
issue preclusion. The issue preclusion doctrine precludes a party from re-lit-
"As one court explained in a Vineyard Sound, Massachusetts, collision case nearly a century ago,
"The narrow channel rule has its advantages and disadvantages, and the aim of the courts is to apply it
to waters where its advantages preponderate. Where navigation is constricted into a stream of traffic, it
is, generally speaking, advisable to apply the rule." Commonwealth & Dominion Line, Ltd. v. Seaboard
Transp. Co., 258 F. 707, 709 (D. Mass. 1919), vacated on other grounds, 275 F. 617 (D. Mass. 1921).
"Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363 (emphasis in original).
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igating an issue of fact or law when that issue was actually litigated, deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment and its determination was essential to
the judgment."' If the relevant factors are materially different in the second
case, the prior judgment would not be binding even on parties to that judg-
ment, to say nothing of the judgment's effect on others who were not party
to the litigation. However, the fact that the prior judgment is not legally
binding does not mean that a court will not find that judgment persuasive -
perhaps even compelling-in future cases involving broadly similar facts.'
f. The Use of Prior Agency Determinations
Although not of the same stature as prior judicial determinations, agency
findings and classifications of waterways will also be relevant. In a few
cases -those involving mariner license revocation or suspension actions for
alleged Rule 9 violations -those decisions were reached in a formal adjudi-
cation before an administrative law judge. Other decisions or determinations
were made in less formal proceedings and often did not even directly
address the Rule 9 applicability question. Nevertheless, the agencies' prior
determinations are often the product of a rigorous examination of many of
the same factors historically relied on by the courts in determining whether
a waterway is a narrow channel. At the very least, those determinations can
be exploited to reduce the burden of any narrow channel designation under-
taking.' 93 Two information sources -one from the Coast Guard and the other
from the USACE-are worth singling out.
g. U.S. Coast Guard Navigational Risk Classifications
The Coast Guard's Aids to Navigation (ATON) program has compiled a
wealth of information on U.S. waterways that will be useful in making Rule
9 determinations. In establishing the standards for positional accuracy in the
"'Restatement (Second) Judgments § 27 (1982). This is not to suggest that the doctrine of issue
preclusion will generally bar litigation over a waterway's status as a narrow channel. Issue preclusion
never applies to deny a litigant the opportunity to contest a factual issue where that litigant was not a
party to the prior litigation, or in privity with a party to the prior litigation. Moreover, the federal gov-
ernment is not bound under the emerging doctrine of non-mutual issue preclusion. United States v.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158-60 (1984).
"Similar questions arise in the use of prior decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
in civil law jurisdictions. Under Article 59 of the ICJ's statute, the court's decisions have no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993. Few doubt, however, that despite the absence
of stare decisis effect, the ICJ's prior judgments carry considerable weight in subsequent cases, as
demonstrated by the court's frequent citations to its prior decisions.
"'In addition to the information available from the Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers, maps,
charts and data on U.S. waterways are compiled, produced and reported by the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) and NOAA.
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placement of its floating aids to navigation, the Coast Guard has long used
a risk-based classification of waterways. 94 To the extent that those waterway
ATON accuracy targets incorporate many of the same factors historically
used in classifying waterways as narrow channels or fairways under Rule 9,
the Coast Guard's ATON classification findings could serve as a useful
proxy for Rule 9 narrow channel determinations.
The Coast Guard uses three different approaches to evaluate the position-
al tolerance level for its buoys. The first approach calculates the waterway's
"risk level." A waterway's risk level (rated as great, moderate or low) is
based on the type and volume of traffic on the waterway, its environmental
sensitivity and the type of bottom. Owing to the greater navigational risk
level, buoys placed in waterways classified as a "great" risk require the
greatest level of positional accuracy when they are put in place. A waterway
characterized by high traffic density, one that includes large commercial
vessels, vessels carrying hazardous cargo, environmentally sensitive areas
or endangered species, or one with hard bottom conditions where a vessel
would likely be holed if it ran aground would likely be classified as a "great
risk" waterway. The second approach for classifying a waterway turns on
the ratio of the channel width to vessel beam. The channel width is obtained
from the USACE project dimensions or charted information and is then
compared to the beam of the calculated "composite vessel" (a representative
vessel calculated from values for the waterway's typical users). Channels
that are narrow relative to the composite vessel beam would be classified as
"high risk." The third approach examines the type of "geographic area"
where the buoy will be placed.' Type 1 waters (rivers, straits, narrows,
canals or channels) are those that are deemed "narrow or restricted" water-
ways. Type 2 waters are those where vessels have more maneuvering room,
but might still be restricted. Finally, Type 3 waters are those that pose little
restriction on the maneuverability of vessels that transit the area.
The ATON waterway classification program and standards provide a
wealth of data and analysis to aid those charged with making Rule 9 water-
way classifications. Any waterway within the "great" or even "moderate"
risk category is likely to present the kind of physical characteristics and
usage that warrant application of Rule 9. The information collected and ana-
lyzed by the Coast Guard ATON program could be supplemented with relat-
ed information collected by the USACE.
"U.S. Coast Guard, Aids to Navigation Manual, Positioning, Commandant Instruction M16500.1C
(1996), ch. 4, available at http://www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/16000-16999/CIM_16500_1C.pdf.
'"Id. at 4-5.
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h. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Channel Design Data
For many waterways of Rule 9 concern, channel design theory and prac-
tice by the USACE will be instructive in making the assessment of the rela-
tionship between the channel's physical dimensions and its usage necessary
for determining whether a waterway should be deemed a "narrow channel"
for purposes of Rule 9. For "engineered" channels, the design process is
based on the dimensions of a hypothetical "design vessel" meant to approx-
imate the kind and size of vessels that will typically use the channel (simi-
lar to the Coast Guard's "composite vessel").'" The designers apply a "stan-
dard clearance allowance" or "safety factor" to the design vessel dimensions
in order to arrive at the channel project dimensions.'9" The channel width
must provide for vessel maneuvering lanes in each direction of traffic flow,
clearance between vessels when passing each other in the channel and suf-
ficient bank clearance to avoid hydrodynamic interactions." Any channel
the width of which is near the minimum design parameters determined by
this process would surely be considered narrow for Rule 9 purposes.
As the dimensions of tankers, bulkers, container ships, car carriers, cruise
ships and tug and tow flotillas have increased over the years, the original
project dimensions for some channels, based as they were on a smaller
"design vessel," will render the channel "narrower" relative to the larger
vessels. Although many channels have been dredged deeper, to accommo-
date vessels with deeper drafts, few have been widened. By definition, then,
existing channels have become narrower, in a relative sense, as vessels have
become wider." A more liberal application of the narrow channel rule could
'"See Bruce L. McCartney, Ship Channel Design and Operation (ASCE Manuals and Reports on
Engineering Practice No. 107), ch. 8 (2005); Bruce L. McCartney, Inland Navigation: Locks, Dams, and
Channels (ASCE Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practice No. 94) (1998); National Research
Council, Risk Management in the Marine Transportation System, Transportation Research Board
Conference Proceeding (1999), at 22.
"MThe USACE has authority to maintain river and harbor projects in excess of the authorized project
dimensions for defense purposes or where the Chief of Engineers determines that such waterways also
"serve essential needs of commerce." See 33 U.S.C. § 562a (2006).
'"Channel width components are calculated on the basis of the beam of the "design vessel." The
"maneuvering lane" for vessels with good maneuverability is 160 percent of the design vessel's beam
(curved channels call for wider maneuvering lanes). T\vo-way traffic requires two maneuvering lanes.
"Ship clearance" is 80 percent of the design vessel's beam and "bank clearance" is 60 percent of the design
vessel's beam. Thus, a channel supporting two-way traffic would be designed to be at least 520 percent of
the design vessel's beam (two traffic lanes with one "ship clearance" lane between them and a "bank clear-
ance" lane outside each maneuvering lane). See McCartney, Ship Channel Design and Operation, supra,
note 196, table 8-1, at 64. The need for newer containers ships, car carriers and cruise ships with dispro-
portionately large sail areas to "crab" (i.e., steer a course at an angle to the channel) against cross channel
winds more than traditional vessels with less sail area must also be considered in channel design.
'"The trend has led to the observation that channel "depth is for productivity, width is for safety," and
greater attention needs to be paid to safety.
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ameliorate some of the loss in safety caused by the growth in vessel size
without any attendant increase in channel widths.
i. The Legal Effect of Agency Narrow Channel Designations
If this alternative is selected, it seems inevitable that some narrow chan-
nel or fairway designations would be challenged in the courts, requiring con-
sideration of the legal effect of those designations. Legal standards for the
scope and standard of review and issues of deference will determine the
answer. Those standards will, in turn, depend on the nature of the issue. If
challenged, agency determinations on factual questions and mixed fact and
law questions will be reviewed under a different standard than questions of
law.
In considering the effect to be given to designations, it may be helpful to
bear in mind the policy justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis raised
earlier. Stare decisis provides certainty and predictability in the rules.
Adherence to legal precedent permits attorneys to advise their clients on
how to carry out their conduct to conform to the rules establishing their
rights, obligations and duties. It promotes judicial economy by sparing
courts the need to revisit legal questions on a case-by-case basis while also
curbing arbitrary decisions. Finally, the doctrine responds to the belief that
fairness requires that similarly situated parties should be treated similarly.
Writing in 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that
because the narrow channel rule does not define "narrow channel" or list the
bodies of water to which it applies, "application of the rule has been left to
the courts."20 The implication is that, had Congress provided such a defini-
tion or listed the waters where Rule 9 applied, the court would have enforced
the statute as written, absent any constitutional infirmities. For waters falling
under the COLREGS, the agency's narrow channel or fairway designations
would in effect supply what is presently missing from Rule 9: specifications
on where the rule applies. They would therefore operate in much the same
oCanal Barge Co., Inc. v. China Ocean Shipping Co., 770 F.2d 1357, 1362, 1986 A.M.C. 2042 (5th
Cir. 1985). The court went on to say:
The Inland Navigational Rules are of recent vintage; they became effective in late 1981.
Because of their relatively recent promulgation, no court has yet interpreted the applicabil-
ity of Rule 9. The new rules, however, incorporate in part the old Inland Rules. Rule 9, for
example, was partially formed from repealed Inland Rule 25, known during its existence as
the "narrow channel rule." Many cases have addressed the applicability of old Rule 25.
They have said that the determination of what is a "narrow channel" is a mixed question of
law and fact. The application of the rule is not based solely on the physical dimensions of
the water, but also on the character of navigational use.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The court's approach comports with the so-called "reenactment rule," under
which when the legislature reenacts a statute it implicitly incorporates judicial interpretations of the pred-
ecessor version.
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manner as the "COLREGS demarcation lines" prescribed by Coast Guard
regulations to mark the boundaries between those waters where the COL-
REGS apply and those where the Inland Rules apply.2 01
For waters falling under the Inland Rules, the Coast Guard now has the
authority to amend those rules through ordinary rulemaking. The agency
could, therefore, either define "narrow channel" (by adding such a definition
to Inland Rule 3) or list the bodies of water to which the rule applies, thus
obviating a judicial determination. Any challenge to such rulemaking would
be governed by the APA.202 Implementation rules and interpretive rules
promulgated by the Coast Guard after notice and comment rulemaking or
formal agency adjudications (in license suspension or revocation cases for
Rule 9 violations) would be entitled to considerable judicial deference."'
The courts also give deference to an agency's interpretation of a treaty it is
charged with implementing.2 " Additionally, because fairways are generally
established by regulation, a waterway designated a narrow fairway (or a nar-
row channel or fairway) might be upheld in a case where the court might be
inclined to second guess the waterway's status as a narrow channel.2 05
The second procedural approach suggested above relies on local knowledge
and processes and would direct Coast Guard district and sector commanders
to work with their harbor safety committees and interagency partners to devel-
op and designate those waters under their jurisdiction that constitute narrow
channels or fairways for purposes of Rule 9. To the extent such designations
were incorporated into rules promulgated in accordance with the APA, they
would be subject to the scope and standard of review described above.
"33 C.F.R. pt. 80 (2009). See also 33 U.C.S. § 151(a) (2006) (statutory authority for prescribing the
demarcation lines). The Coast Guard has also promulgated regulations prescribing the "boundary lines"
for purposes of applying rules applicable to "seagoing" vessels and other requirements. See 33 U.S.C. §
151(b) (2006); 46 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2009).
-S U.S.C. §§ 706, 553 (2006). Depending on the method used to make the waterway status deter-
minations and the perceived accuracy of the determination's factual components, a court might hold that
the designations are a proper subject for judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), subject to the right
of an opponent to be heard. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(e). The contrary argument is that judicial notice is lim-
ited to adjudicative facts, and does not extend to mixed law-fact issues.
'See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (when
Congress has not directly addressed the question at issue courts will defer to an agency's interpretation
if it is based on a "permissible construction of the statute"). See also Shipbuilders Council of Am. v. U.S.
Coast Guard, _ F. 3d - (4th Cir. 2009). Waterway determinations made in the course of agency adju-
dications may be given preclusive effect in some limited circumstances. See Restatement (Second)
Judgments § 83, supra, note 191.
'Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184 (1982) (the meaning attributed to
treaty provisions by agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight).
See also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649 (2000).
'The designation of a waterway as a "narrow channel or fairway" should be upheld if it qualifies as
either. Thus, a waterway a court had previously found was not a "narrow channel" might nevertheless be
found to qualify as a "narrow fairway."
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Advisory determinations by the Coast Guard district commander, captain of
the port or sector commander (like the ones issued by Captain of the Port San
Francisco) that are not the product of adjudication or rulemaking would be
enforced by the agency, but would receive less judicial deference."'a
Alternative 4: Publish List of Prior Waterway Determinations and the
Criteria and Process for Classifying Other Waterways
The "compiled-list-plus-guidance" alternative provides a less formal and
more flexible alternative to formal designation of narrow channels or fair-
ways, while still providing some relief for those unsatisfied with the current
approach. It could be pursued as either an interim measure pending later for-
mal narrow channel designations or a final measure. An implementation
plan for this option would begin with the compilation and publication of a
list of the narrow channel determinations previously made by the courts or
the Coast Guard (in license suspension or revocation cases for Rule 9 viola-
tions). The list would need to be supplemented by an interpretive rule or
guidance document that would define "narrow channel or fairway" and/or
set forth the criteria by which waters not on the list would be evaluated to
determine if they fall within the rule. The guidance document could take the
form of a Navigation Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 2 0 or simply be
incorporated into a preamble in the listing document.208
'United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding that agency interpretations devel-
oped through informal procedures do not warrant the same level of judicial deference given to determi-
nations developed through notice and comment rulemaking or adjudications).
fhe Coast Guard explains that Navigation Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVICs) provide:
detailed guidance about the enforcement or compliance with a certain Federal marine safety
regulations and Coast Guard marine safety programs. While NVIC's are non-directive,
meaning that they do not have the force of law, they are important "tools" for complying with
the law. Non-compliance with a NVIC is not a violation of the law in and of itself, however
non-compliance with a NVIC may be an indication that there is non-compliance with a law,
a regulation or a policy.
NVIC's are used internally by the Coast Guard to ensure that inspections and other regula-
tory actions conducted by our field personnel are adequate, complete and consistent.
Likewise, mariners, the marine industry and the general public use NVIC's as means of
determining how the Coast Guard will be enforcing certain regulations or conducting vari-
ous marine safety programs.
U.S. Coast Guard, Navigation and Inspection Circulars: Background Information, available at
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/NVIC/.
"The IMO can provide similar "guidance" by issuing Safety of Navigation Circulars. Article 2 of the
original IMCO Convention charged the Organization with drafting maritime conventions, agreements or
"other suitable instruments." Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), art. 2, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (the name was changed to the International
Maritime Organization in 1982). Non-treaty documents issued by the IMO are not legally binding as a
matter of international law. See Jens-Uwe Schrider & Anish Arvind Hebbar (World Maritime University),
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a. Listing Prior Waterway Determinations
Compiling and publishing a list of the many waterways that have already
been examined and found to be or not to be narrow channels and fairways
would provide immediate relief for many of the nation's waterways users.
The good news is that much of the analytic work for this step has already
been completed.2 09 Courts have examined many of the waterways in the
United States and ruled on their status as narrow channels or fairways.
Those decisions need only be collected, complied and organized, in much
the same way that navigability decisions are compiled.2 10 The list could
include validity comments by the Coast Guard where subsequent develop-
ments in the law or changes in the waterway render the earlier decision ques-
tionable. The list should include a cautionary statement that describes the
intended use and limitations of the list by the agency and the public, and the
fact that a waterway's exclusion from the list does not imply that it is not a
narrow channel or fairway.
b. The Process for Classifying Other Waterways
The compilation will leave the status of a number of waterways "not pre-
viously determined." Accordingly, a process and a definition or set of crite-
ria for classifying the remaining waterways will be needed. Two process lev-
els must be considered. The first is the process by which the definition or
classification criteria are developed. To achieve consistency throughout the
nation, this process should be undertaken at the national level. The second
level of concern is the process by which that definition or criteria is actual-
ly applied to the unlisted waters. Given the importance of local knowledge
in carrying out this second process step, the task should be delegated to the
Coast Guard district and sector commanders, with instructions to work with
the relevant interagency partners and harbor safety committees to classify
the remaining waters. Including interagency partners and the relevant MTS,
stakeholders would likely result in better decisions and greater support for
those decisions once made. The process might also invite state agencies or
concerned groups to petition for a determination for a particular waterway.
International Standard Setting through the IMO, at 12 ("[d]espite the lack of formal commitment or legal
obligation, there is nevertheless an implied obligation on States not to act contrary to the spirit and terms
of such instrument, and this obligation is usually complied with."), available at http://www.balticmas-
ter.org/medialfiles/general-files_-693.pdf.
'The geographical index in each of the American Maritime Cases reporters and in the reporter's five
year digests collects and organizes cases by geographic area and includes narrow channel or fairway
determinations.
2 Presumably, designated waterways would also be listed in the relevant coast pilot, sailing directions
or port guide and marked on charts.
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c. The Criteria for Classifying Other Waterways
Official guidance for determining which waters constitute narrow chan-
nels or fairways could take one of three forms. The first would be an inter-
pretive rule or NVIC that defines "narrow channel" and "narrow fairway"
(assuming the rule maker discerns a material difference between the two
terms) and leaves its application to the mariner.2 ' The second would be a
NVIC or Coast Guard directive that sets out a set of criteria to be applied by
district and sector commanders to the waterway in reaching a determination.
The third form would combine the two, supplementing a brief definition
with explanatory criteria.
Given the fact that the 1972 COLREGS conferees intentionally chose not
to include a definition of the narrow channel or fairway term, promulgating
an implementing or interpretive rule or publishing criteria for use in deter-
mining which waters as narrow channels or fairways would likely prove to
be less offensive to COLREGS uniformity than amending the Inland Rules
to add a definition. 212 The criteria might be followed by rules of thumb-dis-
tilled from the judicial determinations-setting out certain presumptions
that all channels less than, say 600 or 1,000 feet, are "narrow channels"
under the rule, and that channels of more than 2,000 feet are not.21 The rules
of thumb might, in the alternative or in addition, incorporate references to
channel design standards (any channel less than or equal to 1040% of the
design vessel beam is presumptively a narrow channel) or Coast Guard
ATON positional tolerance determinations (any channel classified as "great"
risk is presumptively a narrow channel). 214
2
"This approach assumes the mariner is indeed going to read the guidance documents (in addition to
the rules) and would still require the mariner to invest precious decision making time in applying the def-
inition or criteria to the waterway's physical characteristics and usage to reach a decision. It also still car-
ries the risk of conflicting determinations by the two vessels.
"'On the other hand, the IMCO committee report reveals that only four States took part in the brief
debate over whether to include a narrow channel definition in the COLREGS, and the recorded com-
ments do not include any consideration of the dangers of rule application uncertainty and conflicting
actions. See IMCO Summary Record, supra, note 8.
"'Any such rules of thumb would have to be clear about how the width is to be measured (bank-to-
bank, between channel buoys or just taken from the USACE project width). The fact that the means of
measurement must be specified further reinforces the case for designations, which obviate the need for
the mariner to make the determination.
"'he effect of any presumption in subsequent judicial proceedings would be governed by Fed. R.
Evid. 301. The need to promote predictability in the application of the rules supports an argument that
any presumption in favor of waterway's status as a narrow channel or fairway would grow stronger over
time, absent a material change in the facts or law.
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d. Effect of the Narrow Channel Compilation and Resolution of
Doubtful Cases
A waterway's status on a list compiled from prior judicial and agency
determinations could be simply "some evidence" of the waterway's status,
prima facie evidence of its status or it might give rise to a presumption that
its status is as listed and shift the burden of production to the party chal-
lenging the validity of the listed status. The effect is likely to turn on the
source of the information used to determine its status and the forum in which
the listed status is being introduced. On principles of fairness and agency
efficiency, the listed status should be binding in any proceeding before the
Coast Guard to enforce Rule 9.215 However, the Coast Guard's status deter-
minations will not be binding on the courts.
In judicial proceedings, the legal effect of a listed waterway's status
would-like the current lists of "navigable waters of the United States"-
depend on the source of the original determination. Many waterway deter-
minations will be drawn from prior federal court decisions and the effect of
any determinations made in those decisions will be governed by the princi-
ples of issue preclusion. To promote predictability and judicial economy, it
would be entirely reasonable for the courts to accord a rebuttable presump-
tion in favor of the status listed and to allocate the burden of proof to the
party challenging that status. The effect of non-judicial waterway status
determinations will turn in part on the process by which the determination
was made, with determinations made through agency adjudications and
APA-compliant rulemaking receiving the greatest deference.
Guidance for determining the status of waterways for which no prior
determination has been made (i.e., the "unlisted" waters) should include a
carefully-phrased caution to assist in resolving doubtful cases. The COL-
REGS and Inland Rules include several such in dubio pro incolumitas (when
in doubt favor safety) rules. Rule 7(a) warns that if there is any doubt
whether risk of collision exists, such risk "shall be deemed to exist." Rule
13(c) provides that when a vessel is in any doubt whether she is overtaking
"Cf. Model Penal Code § 2.02(3) (1962), which provides that, in criminal cases:
A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for
that offense based upon such conduct when: (a) the statute or other enactment defining the
offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made
available prior to the conduct alleged; or (b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official
statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a
statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administra-
tive order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or
body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforce-
ment of the law defining the offense.
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another, she shall assume that this is the case and act accordingly. Rule 14(c)
states that when a vessel is in any doubt as to whether a head-on situation
exists she shall assume that it does exist and act accordingly. In each case,
the rule seeks to reduce the probability of false negatives (concluding that
the rule does not apply when it does), even though it may increase the risk
of false positives (concluding that it applies when it does not), on the belief
that false negatives present the greater danger. A similar admonition should
be included in the Rule 9 interpretive guidance, perhaps suggesting that if
there is any doubt whether a channel or fairway is "narrow" for the purpose
of applying the rule, the mariner shall assume that it is and act according-
ly.216 This approach would be fully consistent with Congress' stated intent
that at least parts of Rule 9 will have "wide application,"2 7 and with the Rule
2 requirement to construe the rules with due regard to "all dangers of navi-
gation and collision" and the canon of statutory construction directing that
remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. 218 By leading to wider appli-
cation of Rule 9, the approach will also reduce the temptation for mariners
in restricted waters to invoke the "rule of special circumstances" in Rule
2(b) to justify a departure from the rules. Such departures undermine the
predictability provided when approaching vessels follow pre-established
rules rather than make up ad hoc solutions on the fly.2 9
"'It is true that this cautionary presumption might lead to false positives by a vessel, which would
thereby gain a priority under the rules compared to, say, a crossing vessel. On balance, however, the ben-
efits of applying the presumption in "doubtful" waters should outweigh its drawbacks. It should also be
noted that this presumption would only address the first of the narrow channel questions: "Is this water-
way a narrow channel or fairway for purposes of Rule 9?" To then apply the rule to waterways that are
wider than the channel, the second question ("Where, within this waterway, is the narrow channel or fair-
way located?") must still be answered before the operators will be able to comply with the requirement
to keep to the starboard side of the narrow channel or fairway.
"'See supra, note 50 and accompanying text (referring to Rule 9(d)).
.. Although it would be a stretch, the keep-to-starboard rule could be characterized as a "remedy" to
what would otherwise be dangerous meeting situations. On the dubious value of canons of construction
see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
"'See supra, note 47 (arguing that, because the circumstances that render a waterway a "narrow chan-
nel" are already factored into Rule 9, they would not constitute "special circumstances" that might oth-
erwise justify a departure from the rules under Rule 2(b)). Broader application of Rule 9 to limit resort
to Rule 2(b) would be consistent with the apparent judicial hostility to Rule 2(b). See Crowley Marine
Services, Inc. v. Maritrans, Inc., 447 F. 3d 719, 2006 A.M.C. 1246 (9th Cir. 2006) (limiting any depar-
ture from the rules for "special circumstances" under Rule 2(b) to cases where the departure is "neces-
sary to avoid immediate danger" and thereby excluding its longstanding application to cases where the
vessels depart by agreement).
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V
CONCLUSION
Conscientious regulators avoid unnecessary ambiguity or uncertainty in
the rules they promulgate to the public. Rules designed to direct mariners in
how to prevent collisions between vessels should be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny. Mariners need and deserve clearer guidance on where Rule 9
applies than they have been given thus far. They should not have to wait
while the possibility of another Princess Alice scale disaster looms menac-
ingly around the next bend.
This Article outlines several possible approaches to provide the needed
guidance. Formal amendments to the COLREGS and Inland Rules would
carry great weight, but they would also take more time than the other
options. If the Coast Guard chooses to seize the initiative, it has ample
authority to formally designate waterways as narrow channels for purposes
of applying Rule 9. Those determinations would be developed through APA
rulemaking procedures, which generally requires considerable time, but
would be accorded more weight than determinations made by less formal
procedures. A less ambitious alternative would be to simply compile and
publish a list of prior narrow channel determinations and prescribe a process
and criteria to be followed in making narrow channel determinations for the
unlisted waterways. The flexibility of this last alternative and its potential to
deliver the needed clarification sooner than the first two options will make
it attractive for some, at least as an interim measure pending formal water-
way designations.
Whichever alternative is selected, the approach to narrow channel deter-
minations should not be parsimonious. Rule 9 has the potential to signifi-
cantly mitigate collision risks in confined waterways and should be given a
liberal interpretation consistent with a precautionary approach to waterway
risk management. The growing number and size of vessels will continue to
strain the capacity of America's waterways. In the absence of a massive
effort to expand waterway capacity, current trends portend a larger role for
Rule 9 in the coming years. Waterways deemed sufficient for fifty foot
design vessel beams will, by definition, be "narrower" if vessels with beams
double or triple the original design vessel beam are introduced into the
waterway. Channels originally classified by the Coast Guard ATON program
as presenting only low or moderate risk levels will be pushed into higher
risk classifications as the number and size of vessels climb and environ-
mentally sensitive areas and endangered species habitats multiply and
expand.
Waterway managers cannot flinch from their maritime safety obligations
by allowing this dangerous yet curable uncertainty to persist. Rule 9 is the
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cornerstone of the collision prevention scheme for confined waters. If any
error is committed in determinations regarding application of the rule, they
should be errors born of caution. Accordingly, any guidance directed to
Coast Guard district and sector commanders and to mariners should caution
them that if there is any doubt whether a waterway is a narrow channel or
fairway under Rule 9 they should assume that it is.
